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1.1 The Absent Mind  
Adam Smith was a Scottish economist from the 18th century who is often called the 
father of modern economics. He was also a philosopher, an author, and was considered to be 
amongst the greatest minds of his generation. Once, while entertaining a visitor at breakfast, 
it is said that he was gesticulating with a piece of toast and was so caught up in his diatribe 
that he placed this piece of toast into his tea pot. Done with the discussion he swirled the tea 
around in the pot and poured himself a cup. Upon sipping the tea his face twisted with disgust 
and he proclaimed that this was unequivocally the “worst cup of tea he ever met with” 
(McLean, 2006). In a similar vein, there are stories of Sir Isaac Newton boiling his watch 
instead of the egg he was meant to be cooking. But they are not the only ones, have you gone 
looking for your glasses while they lay safely on your forehead? Have you tried to brush your 
teeth with facewash instead of toothpaste? Or maybe you have shown up to work on a 
holiday? If so, you can consider yourself to be in some esteemed company. Despite being 
incredibly intelligent, these men and you will still make mistakes or slips that every other 
human being has and will make several times during the course of their lives.  
Some would consider these episodes to be a simple case of absent mindedness or an 
action slip, defined as being inattentive to ongoing activity, losing track of current aims and 
becoming distracted from the intended thought/action by (currently) irrelevant stimuli 
(Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & 
Yiend, 1997). Others may say that it is because you have failed to remain vigilant, referring 
to the ability to maintain attention and to remain alert to stimuli over prolonged periods of 
time (Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Warm, Parasuraman, & Matthews, 2008). Norman 
Mackworth (1948) famously began the systematic study of vigilance during World War II. 
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He ran experiments that attempted to determine why airborne radar and sonar operators on 
antisubmarine patrol failed to report weak signals on their displays that signified the presence 
of enemy submarines, in particular toward the end of a watch. 
Since then there have been many vigilance or sustained attention tasks that required 
participants to monitor visual displays or auditory streams for rare target stimuli over long 
periods of time (Helton, 2009). Despite the now amusing examples from earlier, the ability to 
sustain attention is often vital to successfully complete daily activities. A lapse of attention 
can sometimes have costly consequences, an airport security officer missing a concealed 
weapon, a soldier accidentally firing on a comrade, or inappropriately reacting to traffic 
signals. Given the importance of attention in everyday life, a lot of research has been 
dedicated to the study of sustained attention or vigilance. An issue that clinicians and 
neuropsychologists have faced has been the inconvenience of the long duration of traditional 
vigilance tasks often making the task overly arduous for their subject (Helton, 2009). But it 
was discovered that the task duration may not be as important as many researchers were led 
to believe (Posner, 1978), and so shorter tasks that shared features with their longer 
counterparts were created. The most popular tasks today are the Continuous Performance 
Task (CPT; Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome, & Beck, 1956) where subjects detect a 
single letter (X) or a letter sequence (X followed by A); the Abbreviated Vigilance Task 
(AVT; Temple et al., 2000) which is a 12 minute signal detection task; and most relevant to 
this thesis: the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 






1.2 The Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) 
In 1996, Robertson and his colleagues were investigating how brain damage (mostly 
frontal lobe) increases the likelihood that an individual would be more prone to action slips. 
They argued that action slips in the normal population share characteristics with the attention 
failures of traumatically brain injured patients (in a less extreme way). Robertson and 
colleagues believed that attentional performance measures that correlated with slips of action 
(in the normal population) had not been very successful due to what they considered 
inadequate or contaminated measures of sustained attention. They suggested that there was 
insufficient characterization of attention deficits in patients with Traumatic Brain Injury 
(TBI) and the existing (at the time) difficulty in establishing dependable performance 
correlates of sustained attention failures in TBI patients may be due to the nature of the 
sustained attention paradigms employed. Thus, motivated by the apparent lack of a suitably 
brief and valid test of attention failure they developed the SART. 
Robertson and colleagues believed that by reversing the relative probability of and go 
stimuli (or targets and non-targets) they could create a situation where responses to the 
common stimuli become automatized. So instead of looking for the rare stimulus to respond 
to, subjects would need to look for the rare case where they should not produce a response. 
They argued that without sustained attention to their responses participants would mindlessly 
execute the automatized pre-potent response ongo trials. Thus, the frequency of responses to 
go or withhold stimuli (i.e. commission errors) provides the sought (sensitive) measure of a 
person’s ability to sustain attention. To test their hypotheses Robertson and colleagues 
conducted a set of studies involving both patient groups and normal control subjects. These 
studies explored the relationship between SART measures and everyday attention lapses, 
other cognitive failures and the severity of brain damage. 
4 
 
The SART itself is a very simple procedure. It involves the visual presentation of a 
semi random sequence of the digits 1 to 9 repeated 25 times (total 225 trials), which is 
completed in just over 4.3 minutes. Each digit is displayed for 250 ms followed by a mask 
(an encircled X) for 900 ms (see Figure 1.1). 
Subjects are instructed to respond to each digit (except 3) with a key press (go 
stimuli), and to make no overt response on the 25 (11.1%) occasions that the digit 3 (nogo 
stimulus) was presented. The digits were randomly allocated to five different font sizes in an 
attempt to ensure that numerical value rather than unique visual feature was used to 
distinguish the go digit from the set of digits. 
 
Figure 1.1 A single trial sequence during the SART 
Robertson and colleagues found that the number of commission errors (overt response 
to the go digit 3) committed by normal control subjects, correlated with their self-reported 
rates of attention lapse and ‘cognitive failures’ in everyday life and with reports by 
informants of their everyday rates of similar failures. The SART measures demonstrated 
strong relationships with validated measures of sustained attention (Robertson et al., 1997) 
but weaker relationships with other measures of attentional capacity that were considered by 
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Robertson et al. to involve response inhibition and other components. Additionally, 
Robertson and colleagues were able to predict errors of commission (key presses to withhold 
stimuli) based on performance on correct trials preceding the presentation of a target, i.e. 
subjects’ response times (RT) speed up prior to commission error responses. This was 
consistent with their argument that an error is not just an isolated failure in withholding a 
response but the result of a failure to maintain an optimum approach for the duration of the 
task. 
Since many psychiatric disorders involve controlling urges (in a way similar to 
performance on the SART), there is research that has looked at the cognitive neuroscience of 
“stopping”. There are two paradigms of stopping - reactive and proactive stopping (Aron, 
2011). Reactive stopping is when subjects stop a response when instructed to do so by a 
signal whereas proactive stopping is developed based on the goals of the subject rather than 
an external signal. Many studies (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Molenberghs et al., 
2009) indicate two broad regions of the prefrontal cortex that are vital for stopping: the right 
inferior frontal cortex (rIFC) and the dorsomedial frontal cortex (in particular the 
presupplementary motor area, preSMA). The two regions are said to work in harmony to 
deliver a STOP command to intercept the process through the basal ganglia. Aron (2011) 
suggests that whereas reactive stopping involves completely revoking the initiated response, 
proactive stopping involves a preparatory step before the response is triggered and this can 
occur on a trial-by-trail basis. Aron (2011) also suggests a third stopping mechanism he calls 
“hold-your-horses” where a subject presses a “brake” on response tendencies when conflict is 
found. Interestingly, O’Connell et al. (2008) used event related potentials (ERPs) to show that 
errors in a go/nogo task similar to the SART can be caused by either sustained attention 
failures or by failures in response inhibition and that the two processes are dissociable.  
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A study by Aharoni et al. (2013) using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
demonstrated changes in the brain’s hemodynamic response in the Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(ACC), an area which is associated with the ability to supress unwanted behaviour (Aharoni 
et al., 2014). They used a SART-like task to locate neurocognitive biomarkers that might 
assist in predicting rates of future re-arrest of offenders. They found that the odds of a re-
arrest were approximately double when the subject had lower anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
activity than normal during the task. Another study by Steele et al.(2014) reported a fMRI 
study involving a SART-like go/nogo task which aimed to delineate neural systems involved 
in errors. Several regions were identified during error processing including the ACC and the 
sub thalamic nucleus. They argue that brain areas that are responsible for error processing 
often overlap with those observed in successful response inhibition. The rostral portion of the 
ACC has been associated with error appraisal and the dorsal portion with response conflict 
and error monitoring. 
In the three decades following the introduction of the SART, researchers have used it 
to explore attention functions in a wide variety of populations and contexts. In addition to 
seeing use as an agent to investigate the effect TBI on sustained attention (R. C. K. Chan, 
2005; Dockree et al., 2006; Whyte, Grieb-Neff, Gantz, & Polansky, 2006), the SART has 
been used to study ADHD (McAvinue et al., 2015; R. G. O’Connell, Bellgrove, Dockree, & 
Robertson, 2006), sustained attention in schizophrenia (Hoonakker, Doignon-Camus, 
Marques-Carneiro, & Bonnefond, 2017; Seok et al., 2012), the efficacy of narcolepsy 
treatments (Van Der Heide et al., 2015) and to further investigate sleep disorders (Guaita et 
al., 2015; Van Schie et al., 2012). It has been used to investigate attention in down syndrome 
(Faught, Conners, & Himmelberger, 2016), Huntington’s disease (Hart et al., 2015), early 
Alzheimer’s disease (Huntley, Hampshire, Bor, Owen, & Howard, 2017), and in migraines 
(Kam, Mickleborough, Eades, & Handy, 2015). It has seen use as an instrument to measure 
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the effect of stress on attention (Alomari, Fernandez, Banks, Acosta, & Tartar, 2015; Linden, 
Keijsers, Eling, & Schaijk, 2005), the effect of music (Baldwin & Lewis, 2017), glucose 
(Birnie, Smallwood, Reay, & Riby, 2015), anxiety (Grillon, Robinson, Mathur, & Ernst, 
2016) and age on attention (Carriere, Cheyne, Solman, & Smilek, 2010). It has even been 
used to study the implications of natural disasters like earthquakes on cognition (Helton & 
Head, 2012; Helton, Head, & Kemp, 2011), and friendly fire situations (Wilson, Head, & 
Helton, 2013; Wilson, Head, de Joux, Finkbeiner, & Helton, 2015). Researchers have even 
used the SART to investigate the effects of chewing gum (Johnson, Muneem, & Miles, 2013) 
and chewing betel nut (Ho, Li, & Tang, 2015) on attention, and to look the possible effects of 
meditation on attention (Cardeña, Sjöstedt, & Marcusson-Clavertz, 2015; MacLean et al., 
2010). Given its wide application any demonstration that the SART may not provide a valid 
measure of sustained attention throws into doubt the widespread conclusion that people 
having scores deviant from normal necessarily suffer problems sustaining attention. 
 
1.3 The Debate 
Chan, (2001) called the SART a “theoretically sound measure of sustained attention”. 
Indeed, the assumption thus far has been that the SART measures or assesses attention lapses. 
In particular, the SART’s rapid pace and frequency of responding results in an automated 
response, and that in order to effectively counter the strong tendency to respond subjects must 
actively monitor their actions (Seli, 2016). Based on this assumption, when participants 
experience a lapse of attention, the automatic response is initiated and failure to successfully 
execute a withhold action results in a commission error on go trials. It is expected that a 
proportion of responses to stimuli will also be made automatically. In a follow up study to the 
original, Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, (1999) reiterated their argument that 
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performance on the SART requires sustained attention rather than a putative response 
inhibition capacity (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008, 2009). They argued that performance is 
determined by the duration over which a person must maintain attention over their actions 
and that this demand supports the SART’s relationship to common attention lapses.  
We know that human beings mind-wander intensely (Axelrod, Rees, Lavidor, & Bar, 
2015) and perhaps that mind-wandering occurs during as much as half our waking hours 
(Killingsworth, 2010). Mind-wandering is also considered to be different from other 
cognitive behaviours because it is self-generated, spontaneous and inwardly directed. Mind 
wandering, according to Schooler et al. (2011) consists of two core processes: the 
disengaging of attention from perception (perceptual decoupling) and the ability to take 
explicit note of the current contents of consciousness (meta-awareness). Many researchers 
believe that performance on the SART can be directly attributed to this phenomenon of 
perceptual decoupling (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Jackson & 
Balota, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). During 
states of perceptual decoupling, attention is said to be directed away from the perception of 
task events to internally generated thoughts, and this redirection results in decreased 
processing of information relevant to an external task (Smallwood, 2013a). According to 
Smallwood, McSpadden, et al. (2007), perceptual decoupling is often associated with an 
absence of recollection of task events at a later time. They suggest the possibility that 
perceptual decoupling can occur before the participant is even aware that their attention has 
shifted from the task to internally generated thoughts. Smallwood et al. (2004) suggest that 
when participants in the SART are ‘zoned out’ or perceptually decoupled, they may fail to 
detect that they have made an error.  
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Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, & Smilek, (2009) presented a three-state attentional model of task 
engagement/disengagement that was applied to the SART. Based on the model, attentional 
disengagement during the SART can be described in three distinct states of mind-wandering: 
State 1: Occurrent task inattention, involves a brief or partial waning of detailed processing of 
moment-to-moment stimuli leading to a disengagement of attention from some features of the 
task. This they referred to as ‘tuning out’. They proposed this state is reflected in the 
variability of RTs in the SART and is especially observed via shorter mean RTs in the trials 
immediately prior to go trials error trials in the SART (Manly et al., 1999; Robertson et al., 
1997). 
State 2: Generic task inattention occurs when attention to the general task-relevant aspects of 
the environment is reduced but the individual continues to demonstrate well-practiced 
automatic responding. This is commonly known as ‘going through the motions’ or ‘zoning 
out ’ and is claimed to be reflected in the SART via anticipations, i.e. responses on trials that 
are way too fast to be responses to the stimuli but could instead be a result of subjects 
anticipating the presentation of stimuli. 
State 3: Response disengagement is said to involve gross behavioural indicators of mind-
wandering. In this state subjects may be responsive to only the most intrusive aspects of the 
task environment. Response disengagement is said to be evident when subjects make 
omission errors, i.e. when they fail to respond to stimuli. Errors of omission have been noted 
to occur in the SART with both regular and random intervals between go trials and 
researchers have interpreted them as a break from task engagement reflecting deteriorating 




Various other studies have also shown that performance on the SART could be an 
index of mind wandering across a wide range of experiments (Cheyne et al., 2009; Christoff 
et al., 2009; Jackson & Balota, 2012; McVay & Kane, 2009; Smallwood et al., 2007). Yanko 
& Spalek, (2013) argue that repeated engagement in a task will often result in gradual 
transition from being consciously aware and in control of one’s actions, to a state where 
automatic processes take over our actions placing a lower demand on attentional resources. 
Jackson & Balota, (2012) argue that the SART’s tendency to induce this shift from controlled 
to automatic processing is what makes it susceptible to mind-wandering. 
Conversely, results from more recent studies suggest that failure to inhibit a pre-
potent response rather than failure to perceive a critical stimulus is most likely the cause of 
SART commission errors (Carter, Russell, & Helton, 2013; Head & Helton, 2013, 2014b; 
Head, Russell, Dorahy, Neumann, & Helton, 2012; Helton, 2009; Helton, Head, & Russell, 
2011). Stevenson, Russell, & Helton, (2011) argue that these errors are what Robertson et al. 
(1997) interpret as lapses of attention whereas in traditional low-go vigilance tasks decreases 
in detections over time (vigilance decrement) is the measure of interest. Despite participants 
in the SART being perceptually aware of the go stimuli (McAvinue, O’Keeffe, McMackin, & 
Robertson, 2005), they will often be unable to withhold a motor response (Carter, Russell, & 
Helton, 2013). Stevenson et al. (2011) believe that this leads to awareness of the task stimuli 
being (somewhat) masked by the demand exerted on motor inhibition. Consequently, 
commission errors may occur because participants fail to perceptually identify the critical 
stimulus, or because perceptual identification does not itself necessarily prevent production of 
the pre-potent response. 
Carter, Russell, & Helton (2013) argue that the SART should not be used to measure 
the ability of subjects to sustain attention to external stimuli. They point out that since 
response inhibition is normally measured by the number of inhibition failures, i.e. inability to 
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stop a response, errors of commission in the SART may reflect failures of response inhibition 
rather than lapses in sustained attention. Analogous to arguments made by Stevenson et al. 
(2011), Carter, et al. (2013) point out that people are aware they have made a mistake on over 
99% of occasions when they respond to ago digit (McAvinue et al., 2005) suggesting 
participants are completely aware of the go stimuli yet apparently unable to inhibit a pre-
potent motor response. Consequently, the numerous studies using the SART to measure 
sustained attention may likely have measured something quite different, most likely strategies 
that relate to inhibition of a pre-potent motor response. 
Helton (2005) and Helton et al. (2009) argue that the SART may be contaminated by 
impulsivity, and the constant responding to neutral signals/go stimuli leads to the 
development of a ‘ballistic feed-forward motor program’ which causes difficulty for the 
supervisory attention system in its capacity to control or inhibit actions. Thus, a participant in 
the SART could be fully aware of the stimuli (perceptual awareness) but be unable to inhibit 
or disrupt this ballistic motor program. In fact, Head and Helton (2013) report that 
participants in their laboratory often recollect being fully aware during errors of commission 
on the SART while at the same time are unable to physically stop their hand from 
responding. Helton (2009) suggests that the SART’s response format encourages 
conservativeness, i.e. the participants often try to harness or control their responses; which is 
at odds with the view that errors result from failure to detect the presence of a relatively rare 
nogo stimulus. 
Additional evidence for a motor decoupling perspective on the SART includes the 
fact that an instruction to delay responding reduces commission errors. Task instructions for 
the SART traditionally require participants to respond as quickly and accurately as possible, 
but when participants are asked to slow down (Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012) commission 
errors dramatically decrease. Furthermore, when participants are instructed (via an audible 
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metronome) to delay their responses (Seli, Jonker, Solman, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012), their 
commission errors again decrease.  
In fact, as Helton (2009) ironically points out, even research by Robertson and his 
colleagues (Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999) supports an impulsivity 
perspective on the SART: increase in the probability of stimuli and an increase in overall 
event rate leads to increased errors of commission. In other words, people are impulsive 
because the benefit of fast responses (impulsivity) outweighs its costs. Several studies have 
presented evidence indicating that the incidence of commission errors in the SART reflects 
response strategy rather than lapses in sustained attention (Head & Helton, 2014; Head, 
Russell, Dorahy, Neumann, & Helton, 2012; Helton et al., 2009; Peebles & Bothell, 2004). 
Helton (2009) conducted a study where participants performed global– local letter stimuli 
detection tasks using either the SART or the TFT (Traditionally Formatted vigilance Task, a 
high nogo/low go task). His findings indicated that performance on the SART changed 
rapidly over time and demonstrated an inverse relationship between errors of commission and 
correct response reaction times (identical to Roberson and colleagues’ initial findings). These 
results were regarded as evidence of strategic slowing. Helton (2009) also argued that 
participants in the global–local version of the SART strategically increased their response 
times in order to inhibit the impulsivity which caused the commission errors. There was no 
comparable strategic change in a perceptually identical TFT. Helton, Weil, Middlemiss, & 
Sawers, (2010) interpret the Helton (2009) results as clear evidence for the role of response 
strategy in the determination of commission errors in the SART. 
Furthermore, Helton et al. (2005) and (Helton 2009) argue that the SART is primarily 
a measure of speed-accuracy trade-off and response strategy. They suggest that errors of 
omission may be ‘tactical forced rest-stops enabling enhanced inhibitory control’, i.e. 
participants are taking a breather. Helton, Head, & Russell (2011) introduced warning cues of 
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varying reliability into the SART to investigate its measurement characteristics and argue that 
if the SART is indeed a measure of sustained attention then reliable-warning cues should 
reduce errors of omission. But if Helton et al. (2005) and Helton’s (2009) argument is correct 
errors of omission should occur more frequently with reliable-warning cues because errors of 
omission may be tactically used to reduce commission errors. Errors of omission were in fact 
higher in the reliable-warning cue SART than either a no-warning cue or an unreliable-
warning cue SART adding further credibility to Helton and colleagues argument that the 
omission errors are tactical rest stops. This also provided additional support for the 
perspective that the SART is a better measure of impulse control and response strategy than 
sustained attention. 
Peebles & Bothell, (2004) proposed a computational model for performance in the 
SART based on the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) which 
presented two competing strategies to explain the factors that may be responsible for the 
speed-accuracy trade-off often seen in the SART. The ACT-R 5.0 (Anderson et al., 2004) is a 
version of the ACT-R cognitive architecture that adds perceptual and motor modules giving 
the ACT-R, visual attention and processing mechanisms, basic speech and audition 
capabilities, including elements of motor control to simulate interaction with a computer 
keyboard and mouse. Peebles & Bothell, (2004) built an ACT-R model which mimics the 
manner of interaction between the SART and human participants, via a mouse and text on a 
computer screen (see Figure 2). 
The model contains two competing strategies: 
I-Encode and click: The faster option, but less accurate because the model straight away 
clicks the mouse after detecting presentation of any stimulus on the screen. 
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II-Encode and check: The slower option, but more accurate because the model first checks 
the stimulus to ensure that it should click the mouse and only does so when appropriate 
By presenting this strategy choice as an alternative explanation for commission errors, 
the model calls into question the role of sustained attention in the SART and provides an 
explanation for the speed-accuracy trade-offs that have been observed in the SART. 
According to Peebles & Bothell, the utilities of the two strategies (‘encode and click’ vs. 
‘encode and check’) begin equal but change dynamically from trial to trial as a function of 
their histories of success and failure. Consequently, the likelihood of application of each 
strategy varies from trial to trial capturing the dependence of response times on the recency 
of a commission error. When the probability of error is low the ‘encode and click’ strategy 
builds its utility over trials making this the more likely strategy, except after an error has 
occurred. When the probability of error is high, then the ‘encode and check’ strategy wins out 
but its high time cost lessens its utility quite quickly. So probability of error has the effect of 
modifying the utility of each strategy over trials. In this way their model relates the likelihood 
of commission errors to go stimulus probability. Also, in addition to accounting for the 
response strategy and speed- accuracy aspects of the SART, the shift between strategies 
based on utility explains why subjects are unable to inhibit a response or why they are prone 





Figure. 1.2 Flow of processing in the ACT-R SART model. (Peebles & Bothell, 2004)  
Subjects in the SART are given instructions which are impossible to carry out. They 
are told to respond as quickly to stimuli as possible without making errors on go trials. 
According to the model, utility is a key concept here. Finding the balance between benefits 
(of fast correct responses) and costs (of commission and omission errors) is paramount. In the 
SART where go stimuli are rare (11%) the benefits of speed far outweigh the cost of 
commission errors because there are few opportunities for error, consequently, participants 
will frequently opt for the faster ‘encode and click’ strategy. Probability of cost from ‘encode 
and click’ is p = 1/9 = .11. But if the probability of stimuli, is reduced for example to .50, 
then the opportunity for commission error increases from .11 to .50 and the cost of error from 
application of the ‘encode and click’ strategy has much higher error cost. With equal 
probabilities of go and no-trials, ‘encode and click’ will result in errors on half the trials; it is 
expected that ‘encode and check’ would be adopted much of the time. 
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There also exists the possibility that the two arguments in the debate may not be 
mutually exclusive and that errors in the SART are a result of a combination of both 
perceptual and motor decoupling (Seli, 2016). By the time we reach the general discussion of 
this thesis, I hope to convince you that one of these three possibilities/arguments hold more 
weight than the others.  
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
Chapter 2 to 5 investigate the consequences of shortened stimulus exposure combined 
with the instruction to delay responses until signalled. Chapter 6 is designed to investigate 
how various probabilities of trials affect the commission error rate. Chapter 7 looks at our 
attempt to discern what information is extracted from the digit displays in a modified version 
of the SART before a response is initiated. Chapter 8 reports an investigation of the impact of 
the location of stimuli in another modified version of the SART. The discussion will tie all 






The effects of stimulus duration and response delay on SART performance 
Experiment-1 
2.1 Introduction 
You find yourself sitting at a traffic light at a busy intersection, patiently waiting for 
the lights to change from red to green. An electronic billboard in the distance switches to a 
new advertisement (this is your first encounter with an electronic billboard that are now 
common place) and for an instant you find yourself lifting your foot off the brake pedal 
before quickly pushing it back down. When an action is strongly anticipated and prepared 
what information initiates it? Are we less likely to withhold a highly prepared action when 
we are at the same time distracted by internally generated thoughts or mind wandering?  
In the scenario above a highly prepared and anticipated action sequence (Miller, 
1998) is held in readiness for immediate production the moment a critical signal (the change 
from red to green light) is detected but in the scenario, the readied action appears to have 
been initiated by a completely different and totally unrelated visual event. A plausible 
explanation for the corrective action in the example is that error detection and monitoring 
processes established that the red light was still visible and a stop reaction instruction (Aron 
et al., 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008) was issued quickly enough to halt the action 
sequence required to lift the foot completely from the brake pedal and onto the accelerator. 
Analogous situations occur in policing, combat and hunting accidents when tragically an 
innocent bystander or ally is shot following abrupt change in the visual scene that is not due 
to entry of a foe or hunting target into the field of view (Finkbeiner, Wilson, Russell, & 
Helton, 2015; Wilson et al., 2013). One explanation for these kinds of unfortunate 
happenings is that error monitoring processes (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 
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1993; Taylor, Stern, & Gehring, 2007) have not intervened quickly enough to prevent 
completion of a highly prepared action. Laboratory go/nogo tasks where the proportion of go 
trials is high also generate situations where people hold a much anticipated and prepared 
action (e.g. a key or button press response) in a high state of readiness to be initiated the 
instant a critical go stimulus appears. In this context too, the prepared action is 
inappropriately triggered by stimuli other than a critical go signal. Typically people find it 
difficult to resist the tendency to respond to nogo stimuli; among student populations 
responses are made to about 40% of nogo stimuli (Carter, Russell, & Helton, 2013; Helton, 
Weil, Middlemiss, & Sawers, 2010; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2012; Smallwood et al., 2007) 
A fundamental question is why do people find it difficult to withhold production of a 
highly anticipated and prepared action when non-signalling stimuli occur? A common 
proposal has been that the inappropriate initiation of highly prepared actions occurs when 
people have lapses in attention during periods of absent mindedness or mind wandering 
(Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006; Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; 
Jackson & Balota, 2012; Mcvay & Kane, 2009; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & 
Yiend, 1997). In Chapters 2 - 5 the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) (Robertson 
et al., 1997), is adapted in an attempt to assess the role of disengagement of attention from 
sensory input and the task environment (perceptual decoupling) on the rate of inappropriate 
production of a highly prepared response.  
The SART was originally developed to measure individual differences in propensity 
to attention lapses and specifically to assist in the diagnosis of traumatic brain injury (TBI). 
On each trial in the SART subjects are presented with a single randomly selected digit for 
250 ms followed immediately by a mask (an encircled X) for 900 ms. Subjects are instructed 
to make a speeded key press response to a set of go digits (e.g. 1 - 2, 4 - 9) and not to make 
any response to a particular digit that has been designated as nogo (e.g. 3). Robertson et al. 
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argued that because the same response was required on 89% of trials and because the onset of 
the digit stimuli occurred regularly every 1150 ms, the key press response was highly 
prepared and primed (Miller, 1998) and further that it could be executed automatically 
without the involvement of attention. Consequently, subjects were generally able to respond 
appropriately to go stimuli even when their attention was disengaged. According to 
Robertson et al. inappropriate responses to the nogo digit (nogo or commission errors) 
occurred when attention to responses had momentarily lapsed. Consequently, interest 
focusses on the rate of nogo errors.  
More recently attention lapse has been conceived by some within a broader mind 
wandering perspective (For reviews see Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). 
According to this approach nogo errors occur when attention resources are directed away 
from the external environment and sensory input and instead channelled to internally 
generated thoughts and to the maintenance of a coherent stream of internal thought. When 
this occurs, attention is said to be disengaged from sensory input, including input generated 
by the task environment and subjects are describes as being perceptually decoupled. From a 
mind wandering perspective nogo errors are said to occur during moments when subjects are 
perceptually decoupled. Note according to the mind wandering explanation, nogo errors 
occur when attention is disengaged from sensory input whereas Robertson et al. envisaged 
errors occurred when subjects’ attention was disengaged from the processes of response 
production, not from bottom-up processing of sensory input. However, acceptance that nogo 
errors occur due to attention lapse is not universal. Explanations that do not involve attention 
include speed accuracy trade-off (Head & Helton, 2014; Helton, 2009; Helton, Kern, & 
Walker, 2009; Seli et al., 2012), choice between fast and slow processing strategies (Peebles 
& Bothell, 2004) and response inhibition failure (Carter et al., 2013; Stevenson, Russell, & 
Helton, 2011). Head & Helton, (2013) consider these to be examples of motor decoupling 
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emphasizing that the genesis of nogo errors lies with control of motor actions rather than lack 
of attention to stimuli.  
In the SART digits are visible for 250 ms. But digit displays like those used in the 
SART can be reliably identified at exposures as brief as 50 ms (Dehaene et al., 1998). 
Therefore, it may be possible in the SART for subjects to be perceptually decoupled during 
the early part of the lifetime of a digit but for attention to be re-engaged or recoupled with 
perception later during the display period. Such late recoupling might allow subjects to avoid 
inappropriate response to a nogo digit. On the other hand, if digits are displayed for the 
minimum time needed for accurate identification, the opportunity to recouple attention with 
perception should be eliminated, or at least severely restricted, so that nogo errors should be 
more frequent when digits are displayed for brief durations compared to 250 ms. Experiments 
reported in chapters 2-4 include replications of the standard SART procedures but with digit 
exposures reduced from 250 ms to either 70 ms (Experiment 1) or 50 ms.  
In addition to reducing stimulus duration to near minimal for identification subjects 
were also instructed to delay producing responses to go digits until cued at intervals ranging 
from 150 to 650 ms following digit onset. Only conditions where digits were visible for 50 or 
70 ms were used in conjunction with response delay so that opportunities for recoupling 
perception and attention were eliminated or severely restricted during the display period. A 
person who is perceptually decoupled for the entire period that a digit is displayed should not 
be able to discern whether the digit requires them to make an overt response or make no 
response whatsoever. Therefore, if errors occur when a person is perceptually decoupled, 
delaying the time when responses are to be produced should have no bearing on their rate of 
nogo errors. To the contrary, if subjects commit nogo errors because they have chosen to 
prioritize speed over accuracy of response, then requiring them to delay response production 
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should result in fewer errors because when the response is delayed stimuli can be classified1 
as go vs. nogo in time for an inappropriate response to be aborted before a key or button is 
pressed. Subjects were instructed to delay response production to go digits until cued by a 
change in thickness of the lines comprising the mask (encircled) that immediately followed 
every digit. As Rich et al., (2008) have pointed out in the context of visual search, reduction 
in errors resulting from manipulation of response delay is evidence that errors are due to 
motor control, not perception per se. 
Others have manipulated response delay by instructing subjects to take their time and 
respond slowly in order to reduce errors (Seli et al., 2012), by requiring subjects to 
synchronize their responses to a metronome beat (Manly, Davison, Heutink, Galloway, & 
Robertson, 2000; Seli, Jonker, Solman, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013) and by increasing the 
extent of motor movement required to execute their response (Head & Helton, 2013; Wilson, 
de Joux, Finkbeiner, Russell, & Helton, 2016). Generally, delay did reduce the rate of nogo 
errors. However, in none of these studies did stimulus duration approach the minimum 
needed for identification. It remains possible that subjects could recouple perception with 
attention at a later time during the display interval and perhaps soon enough to avoid an error 
response.  
Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, (2012) proposed that SART nogo errors occur because task 
instructions encourage people to initiate the motor program for the go response (button or key 
press) before they have classified the critical stimulus as go or nogo. Therefore, responses 
made in error to nogo stimuli should on average be faster than responses to go stimuli. Earlier 
Peebles and Bothell (2004) developed a two-process model of SART performance. They 
                                                          
1 We distinguish stimulus identity and identification from stimulus classification. In the present context, a digit 
is identified by its numerical value but relevant to response outcome in a go/nogo situation is its classification 
as go vs. nogo because this determines the appropriate response action as press the button or withhold. It is 
possible to identify a digit but not know the action associated with it. 
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proposed that on each trial subjects decided (not necessarily consciously) to apply either a 
fast “encode and click” process or a slower “encode and check” process to the upcoming 
stimulus. Under the encode and check process subjects did not initiate a response until the 
stimulus had been classified as go vs. nogo. Under the faster encode and click process 
detection of stimulus onset activated the motor program for the response without regard for 
stimulus classification.  
Both Peebles and Bothell and Seli et al. (2016) appear to propose two-process 
accounts of SART performance. Both include a fast process, which initiates a response prior 
to stimulus classification. It seems reasonable that this fast process is initiated when stimulus 
onset is detected. Stimulus onset occurs in the SART when the mask, which is displayed for 
the entire inter stimulus interval (except in the current delay experiments), is abruptly 
changed to a digit. It is likely then that it is this abrupt change in the visual field which 
initiates the fast responses in the SART. This suggests that to avoid nogo errors subjects must 
restrain any impulse to respond to an abrupt change in the field of view by delaying response 
initiation until the digit has been classified as a go vs. nogo. By this view it is the proactive 
control of motor acts prior to stimulus presentation (Aron, 2011) rather than the status of 
coupling between perception and attention at the time of stimulus presentation that 
determines the rate of nogo errors in the SART and perhaps other situations where it is 
necessary to withhold a highly prepared response. This suggests that it is important to 
examine the speed of error responses to nogo stimuli as well as to correct responses to go 
stimuli. 
The first goal of Experiment 1 was to establish whether reducing stimulus duration 
resulted in an increase in nogo errors, as might be expected if subjects were perceptually 
decoupled. A second goal was to affirm that the cued delay instruction procedure did in fact 
delay responses. Finally, the third goal was to assess the effects of delay on the rate of nogo 
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errors using briefly displayed stimuli that afforded little or no opportunity for the recoupling 
of attention with perception. To this end performance on a standard SART with 250 ms digit 
displays and no instructions to delay responding (250-None group) was compared to 
performance on, a standard SART with stimulus duration 70 ms (70-None group) and a 
delayed response SART, using 70 ms stimulus displays in which subjects were instructed not 




Sixty students (45 female) participated in this experiment either for partial fulfilment 
of course requirements or in exchange for a $20 NZ shopping voucher. Their age ranged from 
17 to 56 years (M = 20.4 years). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
The research was approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee and 
students were asked if they wished not to have their data included anonymously in any 
published study. None elected to withdraw their data. 
Apparatus  
Participants were tested in groups of 4 to 10 seated at individual cubicles in a larger 
35-cubicle psychology laboratory at the university. They were seated approximately 50 cm in 
front of an LCD computer screen (377 mm x 303 mm, 1680 x 1050 pixels, 60 Hz refresh 
rate) that was mounted at eye level. Their head movements were not restrained. Stimuli 
presentation and response accuracy and timing were achieved using E- prime 2.0 software 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002) Responses were recorded with millisecond 
precision using the left mouse button of a mouse connected to a serial port of an i7 PC 
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computer (i7 processor) running Windows 7. Mobile phones were deactivated for the 
duration of the experiment.  
Stimuli  
Stimuli were the numerals 1–9 displayed in the centre of the screen in black Symbol 
font on a white background. Following Robertson et al. (1997) digits were displayed at font 
sizes 48, 72, 94, 100, or 120 pixels considered to encourage subjects to make or withhold 
their responses using numerical value rather than an invariant physical feature of the nogo 
digit. Digits were immediately followed by a black encircled X mask (Symbol font character 
196) in the same size font as the digit. The 225 trials comprised 5 replications of the 9 digits 
at each of the 5 font sizes (9 x 5 = 45 stimuli). The stimulus presented on each trial was 
selected at random without replacement from the entire 225 stimuli set. The digit 3 was the 
designated nogo and the remaining digits were go digits so that the proportion of go trials was 
.89. 
Procedure  
Upon arrival subjects were given an information sheet explaining the task and the 
broad research goals and consent form to sign. Subjects were next assigned at random in 
equal numbers to either a standard SART group where digits were presented for 250 ms and 
without any instruction to delay their responses (250-None group), a group where stimuli 
were presented for 70 ms (4 screen refresh cycles or exactly 67 ms) again with no instruction 
to delay their responses to go digits (70-None group) or to a delay group where stimuli 
appeared for 70ms and subjects were instructed to refrain from making a response on go trials 
until the mask changed from regular to bold font, which occurred 250 ms following onset of a 
digit display (70-250Delay group).  
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The inter-trial interval for all groups was 1150 ms. Each trial began with presentation 
of a digit for 250 or 70 ms depending on group. The digit was immediately followed by the 
regular version of the mask which remained visible for the remainder of the trial (900 or 1080 
ms for the two no-delay groups). For the delay group the regular version of the mask was 
visible for 190 ms and was immediately followed by the bold version of the mask for the 
remainder of the trial (900 ms) (see Figure 2.1).  
Subjects in the two no-delay groups were instructed to respond as quickly as they 
could to go digits but to avoid responding whenever the nogo digit appeared. Those in the 
delay group were instructed to respond to go digits as quickly as they could after the mask 
changed but to refrain from responding to the nogo digit and never to respond before the 
mask changed. Subjects in all groups then completed 45 practice trials (one presentation of 
each digit at each of the 5 font sizes presented in random order). Accuracy feedback was 
displayed for 1000 ms during practice trials. Once it was established (via verbal verification) 
that subjects understood their task requirements subjects were presented reminder instructions 
and then completed the 225 main trials without interruption.  
Following completion of the main trials all groups completed a 45-trial digit 
identification (DI) task. Digits were displayed for 250 or 70 ms depending on group. Subjects 
were instructed to press the corresponding number key on the computer keyboard. Unlike the 
main trials they were informed to take as much time as they wished to make their response. 
Identification stimuli comprised one presentation of each digit at each font size. The stimuli 
were presented in a different random order for each subject. The entire experiment took about 





Figure 2.1. Timeline for all groups in Experiment 1 
 
2.3 Results 
Only subjects who had fewer than 25% omissions and gained at least 8/9 (88%) 
correct identifications in the digit identification test were included in the analyses. 
Accordingly, four participants were excluded from the final analysis (one from each of the 
two no-delay groups, and two from the delay group). Two-tailed tests are reported unless 
noted otherwise. Where homoscedasticity assumptions are not met t-test degrees of freedom 
have been adjusted accordingly. Non-parametric tests have been used in the analysis of 
omission errors because the numbers of subjects having zero omissions meant distributions 
were skewed.  
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The effect of reducing stimulus duration. The 250-None and 70-None groups were 
compared to assess the effects of reducing digit duration alone (See Fig. 2.2). The reduction 
in stimulus duration had no detectable effect on the rate of nogo errors, t(1,36) = 0.13, p = 
.899, Mdifference = 0.8% 95%CI [-12.6, 14.3]. A Bayes factor analysis (Rouder, Speckman, 
Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) with scale factor r = 1.0 gave an odds ratio of 4.18 in favour of 
the null hypothesis (retrieved from http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor, June 2018). For 
omission errors a Mann-Whitney U-test revealed that digit duration had no detectable effect 
on the proportion of omission errors, U = 216.5, p = .297. Also using t-tests no differences 
were detected in speed of response to go digits, t(1,36) = -0.18, p = .857, Mdifference = -4 ms 
95%CI [-46, 38] or speed of response to nogo digits, t(1,36) = .17, p = .868, Mdifference = 2.8 
ms, 95%CI [-31.5, 37.2]. Correlations between RT and nogo errors were significantly 
different from zero for both groups but the group correlations did not differ from each other: 
250-None r = -.68, t(17) = -3.88, p = 001; 70-None r = -.51, t(17) = - 2.43, p = .026; and for 
the difference between the group correlations, Zdifference  = 0.95, p = .343. Overall these results 
indicate that reducing digit duration from 250 ms to 70 ms had no detectable effect on any of 




Figure 2.2. Experiment 1 mean go and nogo RTs and percent nogo and omission errors. 
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
The effect of response delay. The effects of instructing subjects to delay responses to 
go stimuli until cued are assessed by comparing the 70-None and 70-250Delay groups. The 
overall effects of delay on nogo errors and go and nogo RTs are displayed in Figure 2.2. To 
more fully depict the effects of delay on RTs the proportion of responses falling in 100 ms 
bands were computed for each subject following the procedure outlined by Seli et al. (2012). 
Group mean proportions are displayed in Figure 2.3. The instruction to delay response for 
250 ms has increased go RTs, t(35) = 4.21, p =.001, Mdifference = 114 ms, 95%CI [59, 170] 
suggesting that subjects observed the delay instructions. The delay instruction reduced nogo 
errors from 40% to 26%, t(35) = 2.12, p = .042, Mdifference =13.4%, 95%CI [0.5, 26.2], but the 
delay instruction had no detectable effect on omission errors, Mann-Whitney U = 175.5, p = 



































the latency of error responses to nogo digits, t(18.79) = 3.16, p = .005, Mdifference = 116 ms, 
95%CI [39, 193]. Examination of Figure 2.3 indicates that the proportion of errors with short 
RTs was reduced by the delay manipulation. In the absence of any delay instruction 72.6% of 
nogo errors had RTs less than 400 ms whereas when instructed to withhold responding for 
250 ms the percent below 400 ms fell to.39.9%.  
Figure 2.3. Experiment 1 proportion of RTs within 100 ms band. 
 
Go vs. nogo RT difference. When there is no instruction to delay responding 
responses to nogo digits are faster than responses to go digits (see Figure 2 and compare the 
two solid lines in Figure 3).go RTs typically fall within a narrower range (see Figure 3). 







































Mdifference = 64 ms 95%CI [42, 86]; 70-None t(18) = 8.09, p < 001, Mdifference = 70 ms 95%CI 
[52, 89].  
 
2.4 Discussion 
The duration of stimulus displays was reduced to near the minimum needed for 
accurate identification so that opportunity to recouple attention with perception (Schooler et 
al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) or recover from attention lapse and avoid 
inappropriate response to nogo stimuli is eliminated or at least severely restricted. 
Consequently, if perceptual decoupling prevents the classification of digits as go vs. nogo it is 
expected that nogo errors should be more common with the briefer than longer displays. The 
incidence of nogo errors was virtually the same with 70 ms and 250 ms displays in this close 
replication of the SART. Further, speed of response to go and nogo digits, incidence of 
omissions and correlations between nogo errors and go RT were not detectably different 
when digits were displayed for 70 ms and 250 ms. These results suggest that perceptual 
decoupling due to mind-wandering did not occur in the current experiment or if it did occur, 
recovery or recoupling of attention with perception was not evident when digits were 
displayed for the usual 250 ms. Another possibility is that the involvement of attention in 
extracting the identity of the digit stimuli has little to do with the genesis of nogo errors in 
high go tasks such as the SART. 
The effect on nogo errors of the combination of minimal stimulus duration and an 
instruction to delay responding until cued was also explored. When stimulus duration is 
minimal, delaying response production should be of no assistance on those trials when a 
subject is perceptually decoupled. This is because with brief stimulus displays there is no 
opportunity, or at most very little opportunity, for subjects to extract stimulus classification if 
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it had initially been missed due to the subject being perceptually decoupled. Reduction in 
nogo errors contingent upon manipulation of response delay is evidence that nogo errors can 
occur for reasons other than perceptual decoupling. When stimuli were displayed for 70 ms 
introduction of the instruction to delay response production until cued 250 ms after stimulus 
onset resulted in a reduction in nogo errors from near 40% to near 26%.  
An alternative to perceptual decoupling as the cause of nogo errors is the possibility, 
outlined in the introduction, that nogo errors occur in a context where subjects have high 
expectation that a strongly prepared action will be appropriate the moment an abrupt change 
is detected in their visual field. According to this view nogo errors are more likely when 
subjects fail, before the stimulus is presented, to take control of their actions and delay 
initiation of a highly prepared motor response (Aron, 2011) until classification of stimulus as 
go vs. nogo has occurred. This view is consistent with the finding that error responses to nogo 
stimuli were close to 65ms faster than responses to go stimuli for both 70 ms and 250 ms 
duration displays and it is also consistent with the finding that requiring subjects to delay 







The effects of duration of response delay on SART performance 
Experiment-2 
3.1 Introduction 
The results from Experiment 1 establish that while reducing stimulus duration from 
250 to 70 ms had no detectable effects on SART performance the combination of brief 
stimulus display with an instruction to delay responding until cued reduced nogo errors from 
near 40% to 26%. Although unlikely 70ms may still provide some opportunity for recoupling 
had perception and attention been decoupled at the time of stimulus onset. Further, Seli et al., 
(2013), who also demonstrated a reduction in nogo errors when responses were delayed, 
directed their subjects to delay for longer than 250 ms. Consequently, in Experiment 2 digit 
duration was reduced to 50ms and different groups of subjects were instructed to delay 
responding until cued 150, 250, 450 or 650 ms after stimulus onset (see Figure 3.1). The 
delays were influenced by (Seli et al., 2013) and 50 ms digit duration was achieved by 
reducing digit displays from 4 to 3 screen refresh cycles (pilot work indicated that stimuli 
were not identifiable when visible for 2 screen refresh cycles or 33 ms).  
As previously explained, instruction to delay responding until cued should not reduce 
the rate of nogo errors among subjects who were perceptually decoupled during stimulus 
presentation and this will be true regardless of the delay period. On the other hand, if nogo 
errors occur because people fail to prevent initiation of a highly prepared and strongly 
anticipated response when abrupt change occurs in their visual field, an instruction to delay 
responding until cued is expected to bring about a reduction in nogo errors, provided the 
delay period is effective in extending response times beyond any threshold necessary for digit 
classification as go vs. nogo. But extending the delay interval beyond the classification 
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threshold should have minimal further advantage. Contrary to this prediction (Seli et al., 
2013) found fewer nogo errors with longer delay. However, in their experiment digits were 
displayed for 250 ms and rather than delay response until cued their subjects were required to 




Figure 3.1. Timeline for all groups in Experiment 2. 
 
3.2 Method 
Ninety nine students (79 female) participated in this experiment in conditions similar 
to those in Experiment 1. Their ages ranged from 17 to 52 years (M= 19.6 years). All had 
normal or corrected-to normal vision and none had participated in Experiment 1. Altogether, 
Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1, but now the stimulus duration was reduced 
to 50 ms (3 refresh cycles) and in addition to a no delay condition different groups were 
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instructed to delay responding until cued 150, 250, 450, or 650 ms after stimulus onset. In all 
other respects stimuli, masks, instructions, and procedures were identical to those of 
Experiment 1.  
 
3.3 Results 
Only subjects who had fewer than 25% omissions and who gained at least 8/9 (88%) 
correct identifications in the identification test were analysed. A total of 12 participants were 
excluded from the final analysis, 1 from the no delay group, 2 each from the 150 and 250 ms 
delay groups, 4 from the 450 ms delay group and 3 from the 650 ms delay group.  
The effect of reducing stimulus duration. As expected from Figure 3.2, contrasts 
between the 250None group from Experiment 1 and the 50-None group revealed no 
significant difference in mean percent of nogo errors, t(36)= 0.0, p = 1.0. Bayes factor 
analysis, scaling factor r = 1.0, gave an odds ratio in favour of the null hypothesis of 4.2 
(retrieved from http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor, June 2018). Omissions were, however, 
more common with the shorter digit duration, (1.5% vs. 5.1%) Mann-Whitney U = 248.5, p = 
.046. RTs did not differ with digit duration, t(36) = .414, p = .681. For comparison of RT 
distributions see Figure 3.3 panel A. The proportion of RTs within each 100ms band was 
found for each subject. Group means are reported in Figure 3.3. The distributions of go RTs 
are similar across digit durations (250-None, 70-None and 50-None). Distributions of nogo 
RTs (Figure 3.3 panel B) are also similar for all digit durations although there is more inter-
subject variation among the proportions of longer nogo RTs as evidenced by the larger 
confidence intervals in Figure 3.3B Reducing digit duration to 50ms did not result in a 
significant change to the correlation between go RTs and proportion of nogo errors, 250-




Figure 3.2. Experiment 2 mean RTs and percent nogo and omission errors. Error bars are 







Figure 3.3. Experiment 2 and 3 No-delay groups, proportion of RTs within 100 ms band A) 




The effect of response delay. The effects of response delay can be seen in Figure 3.4. 
Percent nogo errors for the 50 ms digit duration groups were treated by a one way ANOVA 
(Levene test established group variances were not different), F(4,82) = 4.58, p = .002, ηp
2 = 
.183. This was followed by a set of Repeated contrasts (None vs.150, and delays of 150 
vs.250, 250 vs 450, 450 vs.650). Only the 150 vs. 250 delay contrast was significant, p = 
.005, Mdifference = 19.8%, 95%CI [6.2, 33.5], all other contrasts p > .59. A minimal delay of 
250 ms appears necessary to produce a significant reduction in nogo errors when digits are 
displayed for 50 ms. Greater delays did not produce additional reduction in nogo errors below 
the 21.3% level achieved with a 250 ms delay. A Kruskal Wallis one-way analysis for 
independent groups revealed no detectable difference in omissions between the different 
response delay groups, H(4) = 3.60, p = .462, although as noted, omissions are more common 
with the shorter display duration. RTs were treated by an independent groups ANOVA 
(Levene's test revealed no significant difference in group variances). Overall RTs increased 
with delay, F(4, 82) = 76.7, p < .001, , ηp
2 = .79. Repeated contrasts revealed that the 
difference in RT was significant for all pairs, all p < .005. 
Distributions of RTs and nogo RTs are presented separately for each delay condition 
in the in panels in Figure 3.4. RTs are distributed about modes that increase with length of 
delay indicating that subjects have attempted to observe the delay instructions. In conditions 
where there is no instruction to delay and when the cue to respond occurs 150 ms or 250 ms 
after stimulus onset, error RTs cluster around modes in the 200-299 ms band (no-delay 
group) or in the 300-399 ms band (150 and 250 ms delay groups). With no-delay or delays of 
250 ms or less, responses to nogo errors are typically faster than responses to go stimuli. 
However, when the cue to respond occurs 450 ms or 650 ms after digit onset, errors do not 
appear to cluster about a single mode. With delays of 650 ms error RTs are most common in 
the 100-199 ms band and the 800-999 ms range but unlike the modes with no-delay or shorter 
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delays, these modes are greater not less than the modes for go RTs. With longer delays 
subjects who do not respond to the first abrupt change during a trial (i.e. stimulus onset) 






Figure 3.4 Experiment 2 
Proportion of RTs in 100 ms 
bands for various delay groups. 





Go vs. nogo RT difference. As in the no delay conditions in Experiment 1 responses 
made in error to nogo stimuli by the 50-None group (M = 306 ms) were faster than responses 
to go digits (M = 359 ms), t(18) = 6.43, p <.001, Mdifference = 53 ms, 95%CI [36, 70].  
 
3.4 Discussion 
When digits are visible for just 50 ms and there is no instruction to delay responding 
the probability of nogo errors is indistinguishable from a standard 250 ms SART, i.e. around 
40%. Also, speed of response to go and nogo digits, and correlations between nogo errors and 
go RT were not detectably different from those obtained with 250 ms digit displays. 
However, the incidence of omission errors was greater with the reduced digit duration. This 
may be because on a few occasions subjects realized they had been unable to identify the 
briefly displayed digit and therefore made no response. If classification of a digit as go vs. 
nogo is missed due to the subject being perceptually decoupled during the brief digit displays 
no opportunity exists to recouple attention with perception. Therefore, if nogo errors occur 
because of mind wandering such errors will be more common with brief than the usual 250 
ms display durations used with the SART. As in Experiment 1 no detectable difference was 
found in nogo error rates between 250 ms and brief displays. Overall these results suggest 
that perceptual decoupling did not occur in the current experiment or if it did occur, recovery 
does not occur within the typical 250 ms duration of stimuli characteristic of the SART. 
These results suggest that decoupling of attention from perception is unlikely to be the prime 
cause of nogo errors in high go tasks such as the SART.  
When minimal display duration was coupled with a signal to delay response 
production until cued the incidence of nogo errors declined from around 40% to near 22%, 
but only when the delay interval was 250 ms or greater. As previously explained, error 
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reduction consequential upon a combination of minimal stimulus display durations with 
delayed response production is not predicted from perceptual decoupling.  
Current results differ from those reported by Seli et al., (2013) and Manly, Davison, 
Heutink, Galloway, & Robertson, (2000). Both Seli et al. and Manly et al. required subjects 
to respond in synchrony with a metronome tone. Neither study reported any reduction in 
nogo errors when the tone followed digit onset by 400 ms or less. In contrast significant 
reduction was found with a 250 ms delay instruction in both Experiments 1 and 2 reported 
here. But go RTs obtained by Seli et al. were considerably faster for comparable instructed 
delays than those obtained in the current experiments. For example, when instructed to 
synchronize responses with a tone occurring 400 ms after digit onset Seli et al. found mean 
go RT to be less than 350 ms. By contrast in the current experiment an instructed delay of 
450 ms resulted in a mean go RT of 643 ms and with a 250 ms instructed delay mean RT was 
531 ms. The shorter latencies reported by Seli et al may reflect the differing task 
requirements. Under an instruction to synchronize, responses occurring before the tone may 
represent legitimate estimates of the precise moment of arrival of the tone as they were 
instructed to do. Under instructions to delay responding until cued responses made before the 
cue are in breach of instructions. Therefore, although the instructed delays may appear the 
same in the current and synchronization tasks go RTs are likely to be longer among subjects 
instructed to delay responding until cued than among subjects asked to synchronize.  
The crucial variable associated with whether nogo errors are reduced by any 
requirement to delay response production does not appear to be the duration of the instruction 
but the effect the instruction has on the actual time at which responses are produced. 
Examination of the results reported by Manly et al. (2004) and Seli. et al. (2013), together 
with those from the current experiments, show that reduction in the rate of nogo errors occurs 
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only when go RTs exceed 500 ms or where go RTs are at least 100 ms longer than 
comparable no delay control conditions (this also appears true of Head & Helton, 2013). 
One interpretation of the results from Experiments 1 and 2 is that nogo errors are 
avoided in high go SART-like go/nogo tasks when subjects are able to prevent triggering a 
response to abrupt change in the visual field. In tasks where there is no manipulation of 
response delay nogo errors typically occur when subjects respond quickly. If subjects can be 
induced by an experimental manipulation to withhold producing a response until sufficient 
information has accrued from the display to classify the stimulus as go or nogo their 
responses will be slower overall and responses to nogo stimuli less common. What caused the 
reduction in nogo errors in the current experiment was not increase in go RT per se but the 
effectiveness of a delay manipulation in restraining the impulse to respond to stimulus onset. 
Delaying response production for longer allows more time for stimuli to be classified as go 
vs. nogo and hence for the appropriate respond or withhold response action to be determined. 
In the current experiments the minimum nogo error rate achieved was around 21%. 
This is, similar to that reported by Seli et al. 2012 where subjects were instructed to slow 
down in order to reduce errors. However, Seli et al. (2013) achieved rates as low as 5% 
among subjects instructed to synchronize responding to a metronome beat. Stimulus 
durations were 250 ms in both experiments. Therefore, it seems likely that it is the nature of 
the tasks (synchronization vs. instruction to slow down and cued delay), rather than digit 
duration that is responsible for the difference in nogo error rates between experiments. 
Studies using extent of movement as the instrument of delay also result in lower nogo errors 
than those reported here (down to 2%) (Head & Helton, 2013; Wilson et al., 2018). In the 
delay condition in these experiments stimulus onset provides the cue to begin an extended 
response process. The time provided by the execution of an extended movement also allows 
extraction of information regarding stimulus classification to accrue concurrently with 
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response production processes. If evidence of a nogo stimulus accrues sufficiently early a 
reactive stop instruction may halt the response process before a button press has been 
executed resulting in avoidance of a potential nogo error (Aron, 2006, 2011; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008).  
An important question is how does instructing subjects to delay producing a response 
until cued assist them to withhold immediate response to the abrupt scene changes that occur 
with stimulus onset? Results reported here suggest there may be more than one answer to the 
question. Examination of the distributions of nogo RTs (Figure 3.4) suggests delay 
instructions coupled with response cues behave differently when the delay is brief and when 
it is longer. With no-delay or delays of 250 ms or less error responses are typically fast (there 
are very few long RT error responses) and faster than the mode of go responses. With delays 
of 450 ms or longer, error responses tend not to be clustered around a single mode but occur 
at almost any point during a trial. Further, with longer instructed delays modes of error RTs 
tend to be greater than the corresponding mode for go RTs. The introduction of cues also 
doubles the number of scene changes a subject experiences; changes now occur at stimulus 
onset and perhaps less conspicuously when the mask is changed. When there is no instruction 
to delay responding, subjects in the current experiments can safely initiate their response to 
89% of scene changes (go trials), but when a cue is introduced the number of scene changes 
experienced doubles and it becomes safe to respond to only 45% of the changes. The cost of 
using scene change over stimulus classification as the effective stimulus for response 
production is increased when cued delays are introduced; consequently, subjects may 
prioritize a slower “check” process over a faster process that does not involve checking 
stimulus identity (Peebles & Bothell, 2004). 
There is another difference between current results and those of Seli et al. (2013): 
beyond the minimum delay interval necessary to bring about a reduction in nogo errors 
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increasing the delay interval produced no additional reduction in nogo errors in the current 
experiment but increasing delay from 600 to 800 ms in the synchronization task used by Seli 
et al. reduced errors from 15% to 5%. However, in the current experiment it appears subjects 
who resisted responding to abrupt change that accompanied digit onset sometimes went on to 
respond to abrupt change occurring at cue onset when the mask changed. This may have been 











The role of the mask in controlling effective stimulus duration 
Experiment-3 
4.1 Introduction 
So far it has been argued that reducing stimulus duration to the minimum necessary 
for stimulus identification prevents the re-engagement of attention should subjects have been 
perceptually decoupled during the 250 ms stimulus duration typically employed in the SART. 
However, in the previous experiments it may have been possible for subjects to recover from 
perceptual decoupling if the opportunity for recovery existed after stimulus offset and before 
the delayed response cue. Recovery may be possible even with 50 ms digit exposures if 
subjects have access to the display during the delay interval in some temporary visual 
memory system such as iconic or visual sensory memory (Keogh & Pearson, 2011; Sperling, 
1960). To prevent continued access to the digit display after it ceases to be visible on the 
screen and therefore to prevent any advantage that may accrue from recovery from perceptual 
decoupling, it is necessary to immediately follow the display by an effective mask (Enns & 
Di Lollo V, 2000; Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). In Experiment 3 the encircled X was replaced 
by a structured pattern mask (see Figure 4.1) which incorporates features shown to restrict 
post-display processing. This mask is comprised of line segments that are designed to 
replicate the contour properties of the digits used as stimuli. This is done so that when the 
mask is overlaid on any of the 9 digits the stimulus is rendered invisible. 
The experiment involved a between groups design with no delay and 450 ms delay 
groups in which 50 ms digit displays were followed by the structured pattern mask. To show 
that the pattern mask without delay behaves indistinguishably from the standard encircled X 
mask used in Experiments 1 and 2 performance in the no delay condition is compared with 
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the corresponding no delay group from Experiment 2 (i.e. comparison of the 50-None group 
with a 50#-None group where # denotes pattern mask). To assess the effects of a delay 
following a pattern mask compared to the standard encircled X mask Experiment 3 includes a 




Figure 4.1. The thick and thin versions of the structured mask and digit 9 used in Experiment 
3. Size scaling is preserved. 
 
4.2 Method 
Thirty-nine students (25 female) were randomly assigned (19 to the no delay group) 
in conditions similar to those in Experiment 1. Their ages ranged from 18 to 51years (M= 
21.9 years). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and none had participated in 
Experiment 1 or 2. For the 50#-450 delay group the thick pattern mask changed to the thin 
pattern mask 450 ms after digit onset. All digits were displayed in 120 pt. Symbol font. The 





One participant from the delay condition achieving only 44% correct digit 
identifications was excluded from the final analysis. Percent nogo errors and go and nogo 
RTs and omission errors for Experiment 3 and relevant conditions from Experiment 2 are 
presented in Figure 4.2.  
Comparison of traditional and pattern masks, no delay. The 50-None and 50#-None 
groups were compared. No differences were detected in nogo errors, t(1,36) = .316, p = .753, 
Mdfference = 1.89%, 95%CI [-10.2, 14.0]. The odds ratio in favour of the null hypothesis was 
4.03 (retrieved from http://pcl.missouri.edu/bayesfactor, June 2018) using r = 1.0). No 
differences were detected in go RTs, t(1,36) = 1.513, p = .149, Mdifference = 26.6 ms, 95%CI [-
9.1, 62.3]. However, at 50 ms stimuli durations omissions were less common when digits 
were followed by the pattern mask (1.3%) than traditional mask (5.3%), Mann-Whitney U 
=99, p = .017. The correlation between go RT and percent nogo errors was r = -.41, t(17) = -
1.86, p = .07, which compares with r = -.42 from the 50-None group of Experiment 2. The 
two correlations were not significantly different, Zdifference = .022, p = .982. The change from 
traditional to pattern mask appears to have had no detectable effect on go RTs, the frequency 
of nogo errors or the correlation between go RT and commission errors but it has reduced 




Figure 4.2 Experiment 3 mean RTs and percent commission and omission errors. Error bars 
are 95% confidence intervals. 
The effects of delay and mask type. This involves comparing the two groups having 
no delay with the two 450 ms delay groups in a 2 (mask type) x 2 (delay) design. Percent 
nogo errors and go RTs were treated by separate Mask (traditional vs. pattern) x Delay (None 
vs 450ms) ANOVAs. Go errors were significantly fewer with a delay of 450 ms compared to 
no delay, F(1,69) = 8.92, p = .004, ηp
2 = .114, Mdifference 14.0%, 95%CI [4.6, 23.3]. Neither 
the mask main effect nor the mask x delay interaction effects approached significance, both F 
less than 0.2, both p > .67, both ηp
2 < .003. RTs were significantly greater with delay, F(1, 
69) = 253.9, p <.001, ηp
2.= 786, Mdifference = 299 ms, 95%CI [262, 337]. Mask type had no 
effect on go RTs and the effect of delay was not moderated by mask type; the delay main 
effect and interaction effects were not significant, both F less than .40, both p > .58, both ηp
2 














































was performed. Group omission errors were found to differ significantly, H(3) = 14.9, p = 
.002. However, while under no delay omissions were fewer with the pattern mask, no 
detectable difference in omissions was found between the two masks at 450 ms delay, Mann-
Whitney U = 150.5, p = 961. In summary, instruction to delay responding until cued 450ms 
after digit onset increased go RTs by 300ms regardless of mask type and reduced nogo errors 
equally for the traditional and pattern masks. The effect of mask on omissions is less clear.  
Go vs. nogo RT difference- No Delay Group. Similarly to Experiments 1 and 2 error 
responses were made more quickly to nogo digits (M = 259 ms, SD = 29 ms) than correct 
responses to go digits (M = 333 ms, SD = 94 ms), t(18) = 7.94, p < .001, Mdifference = 74 ms, 
95% CI [54, 93]. See Figure 3.3 which also includes the 50#-None results.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
In this experiment the effectiveness of the traditional encircled X mask was assessed 
by comparing performance when it was replaced by a structured pattern mask possessing 
properties known to curtail stimulus processing (Enns & Di Lollo V, 2000; Kouider & 
Dehaene, 2007). Reassuringly no differences were found in the rate of nogo errors, go RTs or 
correlation of nogo errors and go RTs between the traditional and pattern masks using stimuli 
that were displayed for 50 ms. The pattern mask did however result in fewer omission errors 
than the encircled X mask with 50 ms digit displays. Also, as in experiments 1 and 2 error 
responses to nogo digits were faster than responses to go digits and by a comparable amount.  
In the current experiment the opportunities for perceptually decoupled subjects to 
recouple attention were eliminated by immediately following the 50 ms digit displays with a 
structured pattern mask. Because a perceptually decoupled subject cannot recouple attention 
and perception during the delay interval, introducing a delay should produce the same 
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proportion of nogo errors as a comparable control condition having no delay instructions. 
Contrary to perceptual decoupling, the instruction to delay responding for 450 ms again 
produced a significant reduction in nogo errors from near 40% to approximately 25% when 
delay was introduced.  
Further, the reduction in nogo errors observed in Experiment 3 is not detectably 
different from that in Experiment 2 where stimuli were followed by the encircled X mask. 
These results indicate that the traditional mask, acted effectively in terminating processing of 
the digit stimuli, giving confidence in results from Experiments 1 and 2. The encircled X 
mask and digits were matched for font size in Experiments 1 and 2. Typically in SART 
experiments, the mask is larger and the same for all digit font sizes creating the possibility 
that the encircled X mask used in the current experiments may have been more effective than 
the mask traditionally employed with the SART. Small digits overlaid by a large X may 











Inappropriate production of highly prepared acts: Perceptual decoupling due to mind 
wandering or lack of motor control? 
General Discussion- Experiments 1 to 3 
Incidents of friendly fire in policing, combat and hunting where a colleague or 
companion is shot suggest that people have difficulty withholding a highly prepared (Miller, 
1998) and anticipated action when abrupt change occurs within their visual field (Wilson, 
Head, & Helton, 2013; Wilson, Head, de Joux, Finkbeiner, & Helton, 2015). In laboratory 
go/nogo tasks with a high proportion of go trials subjects respond inappropriately to over 
40% of nogo signals (Carter et al., 2013; Helton et al., 2010; Seli et al., 2012; Smallwood et 
al., 2004), again suggesting people have difficulty withholding production of a highly 
prepared action when abrupt visual change occurs. This inappropriate response production is 
frequently considered to occur during moments of attention lapse (Cheyne, Solman, Carriere, 
& Smilek, 2009; Cheyne et al., 2006; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2009; Jackson & Balota, 
2012; Manly, Robertson, Galloway, & Hawkins, 1999; Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood, 
McSpadden, & Schooler, 2007). More recently such errors have been ascribed to mind 
wandering and to occur at times when attention and perception are decoupled. (Smallwood et 
al., 2004; Smallwood, McSpadden, et al., 2007; Smallwood, O’Connor, Sudbery, & 
Obonsawin, 2007; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). An opposing view is that the inappropriate 
production of a highly prepared action results from a lack of motor control not disengagement 
of attention from perception (Head & Helton, 2013). The major goal of Experiments 1-3 was 
to determine the roles of perceptual decoupling and motor control in the genesis of 
commission errors in the SART. Stimulus durations were reduced to levels near the minimum 
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necessary for accurate identification and subjects were instructed to delay response 
production until cued by a change in the appearance of the mask that followed each stimulus.  
When perceptually decoupled for the entire duration that a stimulus is displayed it 
should not be possible to discern the go vs. nogo classification of the stimulus and therefore 
perceptually decoupled subjects will not know whether a response is required or 
inappropriate. However, with the SART, digit stimuli have typically been displayed for 
considerably longer than the minimum time needed for digit identification (Dehaene et al., 
1998) raising the possibility that subjects may be able to recouple attention and perception 
later in the display period but in time to avoid a response and hence nogo error. Reducing the 
duration of digit stimuli to the minimum needed for accurate identification should eliminate 
or severely restrict opportunities for recoupling attention and perception. Consequently it is 
expected that the rate of nogo or commission errors would increase with reduced stimulus 
duration. In none of the three experiments reported here did the probability of nogo error 
increase when stimulus duration was reduced from 250 ms to near minimal levels (50 to 
70ms). Further, to exclude the possibility that the traditional encircled X mask did not 
effectively terminate digit displays, in Experiment 3 the traditional mask was replaced with a 
specially tailored structured mask that possesses properties known to effectively terminate the 
digits (Breitmeyer, 2007; Enns & Di Lollo V, 2000).go errors and RTs were comparable 
across masks indicating that the traditional mask was effective in our experiments where 
importantly digit and mask font size were equated (typically in published studies the mask 
was larger on most trials so that mask and digit were less overlapping). In light of these 
results we were led to conclude that either perceptual decoupling did not occur in our 
experiments or, if it did occur, recoupling of attention with perception did not happen soon 
enough within the duration of 250ms displays to affect the rate of nogo errors.  
53 
 
When stimuli are displayed briefly, requiring subjects to delay response production 
should have no effect on the rate of nogo errors. This is because if the correct response 
outcome has not been ascertained by the end of the display duration, a perceptually 
decoupled subject will have no opportunity to determine appropriate response action during 
the delay interval. Over the three experiments subjects were instructed to withhold making 
any response until cued by a change in the mask which occurred between 150 and 650 ms 
following digit onset. In the three experiments response delay produced a reliable reduction 
in nogo errors provided the delay period was at least 250 ms. Overall, the probability of 
responding to a nogo digit fell from around .40 in the three no-delay control conditions to less 
than .25 in conditions where the instructed delay was 250ms or greater.  
Others have also manipulated response delay in various ways; by instructing subjects 
to slow down in order to avoid errors (Seli et al., 2012), by synchronizing response 
production with the onset of a tone occurring at known intervals after stimulus onset (Manly 
et al. 2004; Seli et al., 2013), and by manipulating the extent of response movement (Head & 
Helton, 2013, Wilson et al., 2018). In none of these was stimulus duration reduced to the 
minimum needed for stimulus identification. Consequently, reduction in nogo errors could 
have occurred because the delay gave subjects opportunity to recouple attention with 
perception later in the stimulus display period and hence avoid inappropriate response 
production. However, because we found that reducing stimulus duration had no effect on the 
incidence of nogo errors it seems unlikely that the reduction in nogo error rate reported by 
Seli et al., Head and Helton and Wilson et al. is due to recoupling attention with perception. 
Rather it seems that it is the delay in initiating a response that is instrumental in reducing 
nogo errors. Parallel findings and conclusions arise in visual search. When target absent 
displays greatly outnumbered target present displays (low target prevalence) response delay 
has been found to eliminate miss errors in “pop out” search (Rich et al., 2008). This situation 
54 
 
is similar to a high go task except on each trial search involves a choice between two 
responses rather than a choice between production of a single response and withholding all 
overt action. Rich et al. used the elimination of miss errors to rare stimuli under the response 
delay condition to reject stimulus processing explanations for miss errors (comparable to 
nogo errors in a go/nogo task) in favour of proposals ascribing errors in low target prevalence 
situations to an inability to control the highly expected act of responding target present). 
Because a person who is perceptually decoupled during stimulus presentation should 
not benefit from delaying production of their responses reduction in nogo errors produced by 
manipulating the time of response production is evidence of trials where perceptual 
decoupling has not occurred. While a reduction in nogo errors to a little less than 25% of all 
nogo trials was found in the current experiments others report levels as low as 5% and even 
2% (Seli et al., 2013, Wilson et al., 2018). If we accept the low rate of nogo errors reported in 
these studies is due to delay and not the late recoupling of perception with attention during 
the display period, then it seems that perceptual decoupling may occur on as few as 5% or 
even 2% of nogo trials in these experiments.  
Another result that appears to be problematic for perceptual decoupling is the finding 
that subjects in the SART know on over 99.9% of occasions when they inappropriately 
respond to a nogo digit (McAvinue et al., 2005). For subjects to know when they have 
committed an error they must have extracted stimulus classification (go vs. nogo) from the 
display and compared this with their actual response. It seems unlikely such linking is 
possible when a person is perceptually decoupled and disengaged from sensory input 
including the task environment. Relatedly in visual search where targets were rare and target 
absent responses strongly anticipated subjects also knew when they made a mistake; allowing 
them opportunity to immediately indicate their errors halved miss errors when targets 
occurred on only 10% of trials (Fleck & Mitroff, 2007).  
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Consistent across the four no-delay groups in the current experiments was the finding 
that inappropriate responses to nogo stimuli were made significantly faster than responses to 
go stimuli. In agreement with proposals by both Seli et al. (2012) and Peebles and Bothell 
(2004) the faster responding to nogo than go stimuli suggests that nogo errors occur when 
subjects initiate their response quickly in response to stimulus onset and before establishing 
the go vs. nogo status of a stimulus. Since abrupt change from mask to digit occurs at 
stimulus onset in these experiments it is suggested that the effective stimulus for fast 
responding is abrupt visual change. But it is not only on nogo trials that a response will be 
initiated by abrupt visual change. Stimuli were randomly sequenced, subjects could not 
predict whether an upcoming stimulus would be a go or a nogo stimulus and therefore 
subjects should be just as likely to respond to an abrupt change when a go as when a nogo 
stimulus was presented. Consequently, the distribution of RTs to go stimuli likely contains a 
mix of fast responses initiated by abrupt change, and slower responses made after extraction 
of stimulus go vs. nogo classification.  
Together the results reported above are consistent with the proposal that to avoid 
making a nogo error in high go situations a subject must have activated processes that restrain 
the tendency to respond automatically or reflexively when abrupt visual change occurs in 
their field of view. These restraining processes must be in place prior to presentation of the 
nogo digit or soon enough after presentation to terminate an initiated response process if one 
had begun. Also, the response restraining processes must induce a delay in response initiation 
that is sufficient to allow determination of the go vs. nogo status of the stimulus and this 
classification of a stimulus must occur in time to stop a response should one already be in 
progress. This explanation for inappropriate production of highly anticipated response actions 
in high go tasks such as the SART and friendly fire and similar situations places the ultimate 
origins of inappropriate responding in the realm of motor control (Head & Helton, 2013), not 
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perception. Without response delay, perception of the stimulus as go or nogo occurs too late 
to prevent inappropriate production of a highly anticipated and prepared response. This is in 
line with original account offered by Robertson et al. (1997) for the SART. They deliberately 
linked attention to response, not to perception, when they named their newly developed task 
the Sustained Attention to Response Task.  
The consequences of abrupt visual change have been explored in the context of 
attention to locations using 2-choice tasks and multi-element displays (Weissman, Roberts, 
Visscher, & Woldorff, 2006; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1992). Abrupt change that marks the entry 
of a new object into the visual field attracts attention to its location and choice responses are 
made faster to immediately following stimuli appearing at locations to which attention has 
been directed prior to stimulus appearance. These findings would appear to have little 
application in the present experiments and to the SART task because the tasks are so 
different. Displays in the present experiments and the SART do not parse into multiple 
elements; only one stimulus is visible at a time. Further the single stimulus always appears in 
the same location and change from stimulus to mask also always occurs at that location. 
Selection of one location out of a competing set is not involved here. Further, for each subject 
the moment of stimulus onset, mask onset, and mask change is highly predictable; within 
each experiment various ISI’s are constant in the experience of subjects. Stimulus location 
and timing are more variable in friendly fire and hunting contexts. Another difference is that 
absence of focus of attention to a location increases response time in multi-elements display, 
but in the context of go/nogo tasks lapse of attention (which many believe to be the cause of 
nogo errors) results in faster responses. In the present experiments it is not that abrupt visual 
change attracts attention to a location, rather it is proposed that abrupt change of object at a 
known location and expected time causes instant production of a highly prepared or 
anticipated action unless procedures that delay its production have already been activated. 
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Our conclusion is that inappropriate production of a highly prepared action such as a 
key press to a nogo stimulus in a high go task like the SART, or activation of a gun trigger in 
friendly fire accidents, is rarely if at all in the first instance, due to the decoupling of attention 
from perception. Rather inappropriate production of a highly prepared and anticipated action 
occurs because people find it difficult to refrain from impulsively or reflexively producing 
the action immediately abrupt visual change is detected. By this view, to prevent 
inappropriate production of a highly prepared action it is necessary to have in place, prior to 
the abrupt change, processes which successfully delay initiation of the action until the go vs. 
nogo classification of the stimulus has been extracted and is available to guide action. The 
ultimate cause of inappropriate action is not the decoupling of perception from attention but 
lack of motor control. The present experiments leave open the possibility that attention lapse 
or disengagement of attention, whether due to mind wandering or for other reasons, reduces 
the ability to refrain from responding to abrupt visual change. In life threatening situations 
such as combat, policing and in previous periods in human evolution, rapid production of a 
prepared and anticipated response to any abrupt visual change is more likely to be life 
preserving than delaying the action to allow identification of the cause of the change as 
benign or dangerous. This perspective raises many questions for further research. What 
determines the level of preparedness of an action? Can multiple different actions be 
simultaneously held in high states of readiness? Would people also respond impulsively to 
abrupt auditory or other sensory change? What is the role of attention in controlling the 
tendency to respond to abrupt change? Are some people more prone than others to respond to 






The effects of the proportion of go trials on SART performance 
Experiment -4 
6.1 Introduction 
In this experiment the proportion of go trials was varied from a low of 50% to 100% 
go trials. Several theories of SART performance predict an increase in nogo errors and a 
speeding of responses to go stimuli with increasing proportion of go trials. Robertson et al. 
(1997) proposed that the probability of attention lapse, and hence nogo error, increased the 
longer the run of uninterrupted of go trials. Since the average run length is greater the higher 
the proportion of go trials it follows that errors will become more likely as the proportion of 
go trials increases. Robertson and colleagues also suggested responses became more 
automatized and faster with increasing run length. Average run length is greater the higher 
the proportion of go trials giving rise to faster go responses the higher the proportion of go 
trials. Similar predictions can be derived from perceptual decoupling (Cheyne et al., 2009; 
Smallwood et al., 2004; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) except that instead of withdrawal of 
attention from responses, attention is said to be disconnected from perception, again resulting 
in greater frequency of commission error and faster responses to go stimuli when go 
prevalence is higher. 
The account offered by Peebles and Bothell (2004) does not involve attention. Instead 
subjects make a choice between a fast click strategy and a slow check strategy on each trial. 
With the click strategy responses are initiated without regard to the go vs. nogo classification 
of digits. The slower check process does verify digit classification before making a response 
or withhold as appropriate. On each trial the strategy having greater benefit relative to cost is 
adopted. When 90% of trials are go trials the fast process can be applied because the benefit 
59 
 
of speed outweighs the smaller cost of relatively rare error; speedy response on every trial 
regardless of digit classification incurs cost, at most, on 10% of trials. However, when 50% 
of trials are nogo the cost of error from adopting the fast strategy could result in error on as 
many as 1 in every 2 trials; the higher the proportion of go trials the lower the cost of error 
from adopting the fast process. RTs on go trials are expected to decrease with increasing 
proportion of go trials because more frequent application of the fast process results in 
proportionately more of the responses to go trials being generated by the fast process. The 
choice mechanism relies on past history of success (from respond when go, withhold when 
nogo), not current digit classification. Therefore, to the extent that the fast process has 
success it will be applied on go trials. 
The theories of SART performance outlined above all predict that error responses will 
be made more quickly to nogo digits than responses to go digits. But what are the 
expectations for the effects of go prevalence on speed of response on nogo trials? For Peebles 
and Bothell (2004) and the proposal that subjects initiate the response process upon detection 
of abrupt visual change, the prediction is clear. If all nogo errors result from application of 
the same fast strategy or in response to detection of abrupt change, then error RTs should be 
the same regardless of the proportion of go trials. 
6.2 Method 
Participants 
A total of 406 introductory psychology students (289 female) at the University of 
Canterbury served as participants. Their ages ranged from 17 to 49 years (M = 19.8 years). 
All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The research was approved by the University 
of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee and students were asked if they wished not to have 




Participants were tested in the context of their regular weekly laboratory session, 
which contributed to course credit. They were seated approximately 50cm in front of an eye-
level LCD computer screen (377 mm x 303 mm, 1680 x 1050 pixels, 60 Hz refresh rate) in 
individual cubicles in a larger 36-cubicle psychology computer laboratory. Their head 
movements were not restrained. Stimuli presentation and response accuracy and timing were 
achieved using E- prime 2.0 software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Responses 
were recorded using the spacebar on a keyboard connected to an i7 PC computer running 
Windows 7. 
Stimuli 
Following the normal procedures of the SART stimuli were the numerals 1–9 
displayed in the centre of the screen in white Symbol font at sizes 48, 72, 94, 100, or 120 
pixels on a black background. They were immediately followed by a white encircled X (the 
mask) in the same size font. The digit 3 was the designated nogo and the remaining digits 
were go digits. Digits were displayed for 250 ms, with mask visible for 900 ms. 
Procedure 
Subjects in each laboratory class were randomly assigned to one of ten groups. 
Groups varied in proportion of go trials as follows: Group 1 50%, Group 2 64%, Group 3 
74%, Groups 4 to 9 78% to 98% in 4% increments and Group 10 100%. Digit and font size 
were determined randomly within the provision that the requisite number of go and nogo 
trials occurred in each block of 50 trials. Subjects completed 5 blocks of 50 trials in which 
they were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible by pressing the spacebar 
to go digits and to make no response to the nogo digit 3. Only the first response made during 
the 1150 ms interval between the onset of a digit and offset of the mask was recorded. All 
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subjects, regardless of prevalence group, completed 16 practice trials, 8 go and 8 nogo with 
go digits and font size selected at random (within the constraint that the number of go and 
nogo trials was equal). Practice trials were identical to the main trials except that visual 
feedback informing subjects of the correct action (press the space bar or make no response) 
was displayed at the end of the trial interval for 1000 ms following both a failure to respond 
to a go digit (omission) and production of a response to a nogo digit (nogo or commission 
error). No feedback was provided during the main trials. The experiment took about 15 
minutes to complete. 
  
6.3 Results 
Two subjects were excluded from the analysis. One in group 2 (64% go trials) 
recorded a response on all 250 trials. One subject in Group 8 (94% go trials) registered a 
response for only 20% of go trials. Because go and nogo trials appeared in equal numbers 
during practice results from the first 50-trial block were not included in the following 
analyses. The first block provided opportunity for subjects to become familiar with the 
proportion of go trials applying to them. All analyses involve blocks 2-5. Error rates are 
presented in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Mean commission and median omission errors as a function of proportion of 
trials. Error bars are 95% Confidence Intervals. 
 
Omissions: Subjects rarely failed to respond to go digits. Overall median probability 
of making an omission error was .009. A Kruskal Wallis analysis revealed that groups did 
differ in their rate of omissions, H(9) = 29.06, p = .001. Follow up analyses using a Stepwise 
step down procedure (Field, 2013, pp. 244-246) revealed that Groups 2-9 comprised a 
homogeneous group that was distinguishable from Group 1 (Mdn = .020) and Group 10 Mdn 
= .025), Groups 2-9, H(7) = 7.75, adjusted p = .422. 
Commissions Errors: Subject nogo error probabilities were treated by a between 
Groups (Excluding group 10 where all trials were go trials) ANOVA to assess the effects of 
proportion of go trials on error rate. Probability of commission error increased with 
proportion of go trials, F(8, 353) = 25.3, p = < .001, ηp
































fit to the means plotted in Figure 6.1 exponential and power functions produced the highest 
R2 values ( 98) as illustrated in the figure. 
 
The effects of proportion of go trials on RTs: Two subjects in Group 8 (94% trials) 
were excluded from the analysis of RTs because they had no commission errors and hence no 
RTs for nogo trials. Mean go and mean nogo RTs were found for each subject. Mean group go 
and nogo RTs are displayed in Figure 6.2. Subject mean RTs were treated by a mixed Groups 
(Groups 1-9) X go vs.nogo ANOVA. RTs decreased with increasing proportion of go trials, 
F(8,351) = 22.2, p <.001, ηp
2 = .336. Responses to go stimuli were also slower than error 
responses to nogo stimuli, F(1, 351) = 336.6, p < .001, ηp
2 = .490, MDifference = 52 ms, 95%CI 
[49, 55]. The groups X go vs. nogo interaction was not significant, F(8, 351) = 1.48, p = .165, 
ηp
2 = .033. Trend analyses of group differences could not be conducted using ANOVA 
because intervals between groups in proportions of go trials are not equal. However, trend 
lines were fitted to the group means in Figure 6.2. The best fitting lines, second order 








As predicted by all theories of SART performance outlined in the introduction, the 
probability of commission error increased with increasing proportion of go trials. The 
theories made no prediction about the exact relationship between proportion of go trials and 
rate of nogo error but results indicate a positively accelerating relationship. Also, as predicted 
go RTs fell with increasing prevalence of go trials this time with the rate of decrease itself 
steepening with higher go prevalence. Also in accord with predictions, error responses to 
nogo digits were faster by about 50 ms than responses to go digits, a figure which compares 
with Experiments 1 to 3. However, unexpectedly speed of response to nogo digits also 
y = -353.87x2 + 248.68x + 400.53
R² = 0.9637

























decreased with increasing proportion of go trials and at a rate not detectably different from 
that of go trials.  
This is an important result. It is not predicted by the Peebles and Bothell (2004) model 
which postulates a choice between a fast click and a slower check process on each trial. Nogo 
errors result from application of the fast process. If the same fast process is responsible for 
nogo errors no matter the proportion of go trials, nogo RTs should be constant or at least very 
similar across variations in go prevalence. Similarly, if nogo errors occur when subjects 
respond to the occurrence of abrupt visual change, not digit classification, it is reasonable to 
expect speed of response to abrupt visual change also to be independent of the proportion of 
go trials experienced by a subject. The finding that nogo RTs decrease with increasing 
proportion of go trials is inconsistent with all proposals incorporating the assumption that 
nogo errors are produced by an identical process requiring the same completion time 
regardless of the proportion of go trials.  
The proposal that errors occur when subjects respond to abrupt visual change or adopt 
a fast process (Peebles & Bothell, 2004) can be accommodated. If subjects use abrupt change 
as the signal to initiate their response they may also be able to alter the speed with which the 
response action or fast process is implemented; confident actions may be executed with more 
force and faster. Another possibility is that subjects may delay the initiation of the response 
or fast process, the extent of the delay being affected by the proportion of go trials. Both 
delay and reduced speed of implementation provide extended opportunity for concurrent 
processes of stimulus extraction to proceed. When the chances of a nogo stimulus occurring 
are low (high go prevalence) little benefit accrues from extending opportunities for stimulus 
extraction; the outcome is likely to be respond. Therefore, in high go situations, subjects will 
be more inclined to respond with more force and faster, or not to delay initiation of the 
response process when they detect abrupt change.  
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Cheyne et al. (2009) proposed that omissions indicate instances when a subject is in a 
state of response disengagement, the most severe of three levels of disengagement of 
attention from the task that they put forward. But trials where subjects failed to respond at all 
were quite rare. The conclusion to be drawn from the present results is that that subjects 
rarely suffer this most pronounced degree of mind wandering, and when they do the duration 
of disengagement is typically confined to a single trial. Further omissions appear stable over 
a range of go probabilities from .64 to .98. This is counter to the argument (Manly et al., 
1999) that repeated responding leads to attentional disengagement. By their argument if 
omissions are reflective of attention disengagement we would expect a monotonic increasing 
relation between go probability and omissions. Helton and colleagues (Head & Helton, 2013; 
Helton, 2009; Helton, Kern, & Walker, 2009) have suggested that omissions occur when 
subjects rest from the demands of frequent responding. By this argument omissions are also 
expected to increase with the proportion of go trials. Contrary to these views omission errors 
were stable across the range of go probabilities from .64 to .98. An omission could occur if an 
anticipatory response on a particular trial occurred during the response interval for the 
previous trial, where it was not recorded (due to prior response during the interval) and it was 
perceived as applying to the current digit. In other words, omissions could occur when 
subjects attempt to synchronize responding with the onset of a stimulus regardless of its go 







An investigation of the effect of flanker stimuli in the SART 
Experiment-5 
7.1 Introduction 
The experiments reported in Chapters 2-4 showed reducing stimulus duration to near 
the minimum necessary for identification had no detectable effect on the incidence of nogo 
errors, but instructing subjects to delay responding until cued did significantly reduce the rate 
nogo errors. Also error responses to nogo digits were typically faster than responses to go 
stimuli. To explain these findings it was proposed that subjects have a strong tendency in 
high go situations to initiate a prepared response as soon as they detect abrupt change in their 
field of view. Response production is thought to be initiated before the go vs. nogo status of 
the stimulus is extracted. While it may be still be possible to ascribe nogo errors to 
incomplete perceptual processing of stimuli, it is important to note that incomplete extraction 
of stimulus information is not considered due to lack of attention or limitation of processes 
related to perception; rather the response process is triggered prematurely and independently 
of stimulus analysis. By this view the prime cause of nogo error has to do with inadequate 
motor control not perceptual processes involving the extraction of information. The current 
experiment further explores the role of perceptual processing in the in the genesis of nogo 
errors in high go tasks such as the SART by using a flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) in 
conjunction with manipulation of the proportion of go trials or prevalence of go trials.  
In the 2-choice flanker task subjects respond to target stimuli that are flanked by so-
called distractors. On different trials the distractors are associated either with the same 
response as the target (congruent trials) or a different response action (incongruent trials). 
The dependent variable of interest is the difference in choice RT between incongruent and 
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congruent displays. When incongruent RTs exceed congruent RTs their difference is 
described as a flanker congruency effect (FCE) (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Lehle & Hübner, 
2008; Sanders & Lamers, 2002). If a FCE also occurs in a go/nogo task RTs on go trials to 
incongruent go displays will be reliably longer than RTs to stimuli flanked by congruent 
stimuli. In the present context if subjects identify go stimuli before initiating a response they 
should display a flanker congruency effect (FCE) such that go targets flanked by congruent 
digits will be responded to more quickly than to go targets flanked by incongruent digits. On 
the other hand, if subjects begin their response before identifying the digits there should be no 
difference in response time between congruent and incongruent go trials. 
Additionally, the magnitude of FCE found in go/nogo tasks is predicted to decrease 
the higher the proportion of go trials. The rate of responding to nogo stimuli in SART-like 
tasks has been found greater the higher the proportion of go trials (Experiment 4, Wilson, 
Finkbeiner, de Joux, Russell, & Helton, 2016). Peebles and Bothell (2004) emphasise the 
importance of the costs of error and benefits of speed. When go and nogo stimuli are equally 
likely the cost of responding on every trial is a 50% error rate, but when 90% of trials are go 
trials choosing to respond on every trial has a maximal error rate of just 10%. If subjects take 
time when go and nogo trials are equally likely, to extract sufficient information to avoid 
nogo errors, then response times to congruent go stimuli should be faster than to incongruent 
go stimuli, producing a FCE similar to that found for 2-choice tasks. On the other hand, when 
go prevalence is high (90%) and where subjects are far more inclined to initiate their 
response rapidly, perhaps when an abrupt screen change is detected, there should be little if 
any difference in RT between incongruent and congruent go trials. In short, the higher the 
proportion of stimuli the smaller the flanker congruency effect expected.  
It is also worth considering the role of flankers on performance on nogo trials. 
According to advocates of perceptual decoupling inappropriate response to a nogo stimulus 
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occurs because perception was decoupled from attention during the time a stimulus was 
visible. Consequently, it is unlikely that congruency should have any bearing on the rate of 
nogo errors or the speed of error response. Similar predictions follow from proposals put 
forward by Robertson and colleagues (Manly et al., 1999; Robertson et al., 1997) who 
suggest no go errors occur when lack of attention allows production of an automatized 
response. Also, the proposal that abrupt screen change, not stimulus identity, sparks response 
initiation leads to the prediction that nogo errors and speed of error responses should not be 
affected by congruency. All of these explanations would be challenged if nogo errors 
occurred more often to incongruent than congruent nogo displays and if speed of error 
response was affected by congruency. 
In the present experiment the proportion of go trials are varied from .50 to .90 and 
subjects are presented displays comprising a central go or nogo digit which was flanked on 
both sides by a pair of congruent or incongruent digits. The expectation is that RTs on go 
trials will be longer to incongruent than congruent displays when go prevalence is low (50%) 
but that this FCE will diminish to zero or near zero when go prevalence is high (90%). 
Further, congruency is not expected to affect the probability nogo error or speed of response 
to nogo digits. Additionally, it is expected from Experiments 1 to 4 that error responses to 




A total of 520 students (349 female) from an introductory psychology class at the 
University of Canterbury completed the tasks during the first of their regular weekly 
laboratory sessions. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants 
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ranged in age between 17 and 66 years (M = 19.9 years, SD = 4.9 years). The research was 
approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee and students were asked 
if they wished not to have their data included anonymously in any published study. None 
elected to withdraw their data. 
Apparatus  
Participants were tested in groups of 25-36 seated at individual work stations in a 
larger laboratory at the university. They were seated approximately 50cm in front of an LCD 
computer screen (377 mm x 303 mm, 1680 x 1050 pixels, 60 Hz refresh rate) that was 
mounted at eye level. Their head movements were not restrained. Stimuli presentation and 
response accuracy and timing were achieved using E- prime 2.0 software (Schneider, 
Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). If subjects made multiple responses on a trial these were all 
were recorded but response time was recorded for the last response alone. Responses were 
recorded with millisecond precision using the left mouse button connected to a serial port of 
an i7 PC computer running Windows 7. Mobile phones were deactivated for the duration of 
the experiment. 
Procedure 
Each trial consisted of a 5-digit horizontal string displayed in the centre of the screen 
and comprising a central target digit and four identical flanking digits, which were never the 
same as the target. The digit strings, visible for 250 ms, were followed by a central “+” 
fixation for 900 ms; trials were presented at the standard SART rate of one every 1150 ms. 
Digits were displayed in black in Consolas 60-point font on a white background. Subjects 
were instructed to press the left mouse button with their right index finger whenever a central 
digit less than 5 appeared (go digits) and to make no response when anything else appeared. 
Digit strings were either congruent or incongruent (except for a group presented only single 
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digit displays). Congruent strings were those where flanking and target digits were associated 
with the same response action (e.g. 44244 = press button, 66866 = withhold). With 
incongruent strings actions associated with the target and flanker were different (e.g. 44644 - 
respond and 77377 - withhold). Congruent strings were presented on 80% of trials to all 
groups to enhance the effect of flanker congruity (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Lehle & Hübner, 
2008; Sanders & Lamers, 2002).Subjects were presented 250 trials randomized over 50-trial 
blocks. Additionally, subjects received 50 practice trials appropriate to their condition with 
error feedback rather than the typical 18 trial SART procedure. The greater practice provided 
opportunity for subjects to realize that flanker congruent trials were relatively common so as 




  Group                                      Task                                     Stimuli                                     p(go) 
Go-nogo .500                           go-nogo                                 Flanker                                        0.500   
Go-nogo .633                           go-nogo                                 Flanker                                        0.633     
Go-nogo .767                           go-nogo                                 Flanker                                        0.767     
Go-nogo .900                           go-nogo                                 Flanker                                        0.900 
Single digit                               go-nogo                                single digit                                   0.900 
 
There were five experimental groups as displayed in Table 7.1. Four groups 
completed the flanker go/nogo task. These four groups differed in the proportion of go trials 
they experienced (see Table 7.1). There was also a .90 no-flanker group (to ascertain whether 
the presence of flankers and the extended nogo digit set produced results comparable with 





While a few subjects made multiple button press responses on many trials (up to 7 
responses on some trials) overall multiple responses were infrequent. In an attempt to remove 
subjects who did not to engage in the task because they either pressed a button repeatedly 
regardless of stimuli conditions or failed make a response on a majority of go trials, only 
subjects who made multiple responses on fewer than 20% of go trials and who made a single 
response to at least 50% of go digits were included in the following analyses. The number 
excluded from each group ranged from 3 to 7 out of the approximately 100 subjects per group 
and the number excluded did not appear to be related to the proportion of go trials. 
 
Trials on which remaining subjects made multiple responses were not included in the 
analyses. The probability of multiple responses ranged from .001 (63% go trials) to .007 
































The effects of congruency on andgo RTS. For each subject mean go and mean nogo 
RT was found for congruent and incongruent trials. The means of subject mean RTs are 
displayed in Figure 7.1. Subject mean RTs were treated by a mixed Prevalence group X go 
vs. nogo X Congruent vs. Incongruent ANOVA. The congruency X go vs. nogo interaction 
was significant, F(1, 368) = 45.7, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11. No other interactions were significant. 
Averaged over all prevalence groups the mean FCE for go trials was 27.4 ms and 2.7 ms for 
nogo trials. Separate mixed Prevalence group X Congruency analyses were performed on go 
and nogo data. 
 
For go data RTs from fell from near 400 ms (50% go) to 320 ms (90% go), F(3, 407) 
= 42.3, p < .001, ηp
2 = .238. Both linear (p < .001) and quadratic (p = .004) trend components 
were significant. Also there was a strong congruency effect, F(1, 407) = 566.6, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.582, and a smaller prevalence X congruency interaction effect, F(3,407) = 5.7, p = .001, ηp
2 
= .040. Mean FCE (incongruent minus congruent RT) was found for each prevalence group. 
Results were: 50% go M = 34.8 ms, 95%CI [30.4, 39.2]; 63% go M = 27.4 ms, 95%CI [22.7, 
32.1]; 76% go M = 25.2, 95%CI [20.6, 30.0]; 90% go M = 22.2, 95%CI [17.8, 26.6]. Turning 
to the analysis of nogo trials, RTs fell by approximately 80 ms from 357 ms (50% go group) 
to 280 ms (90% go group) with increasing go prevalence, F(3, 368) = 24.8,p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.168. However the congruency effect was not significant, F(1, 368) = 0.4, p = .528, ηp
2 = 
.001. . The prevalence group X congruency interaction did not approach significance, F(3, 
368) = 0.3, p = .823, ηp
2 = .002. 
 
Overall responses made in error to nogo displays were faster (M = 322 ms) than 
responses to go displays (M = 378 ms), F(1, 368) = 482.9, p < .001, ηp
2 = .573, MDifference = 56 
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ms but as noted above the go vs. nogo X congruency interaction was significant. Examination 
of Figure 7.1 indicates that the go vs. nogo difference was greater for incongruent (71 ms, 
95%CI [63,77]) than congruent displays (40 ms, 95%CI [34, 47]). This difference occurs 
because congruency has no effect RTs on incongruent trials but incongruent go trials are 
relatively slower. 
The effects of congruency on nogo errors. The probability of nogo error was 
computed for each subject in the flanker groups separately for congruent and incongruent 
trials. Group means are displayed in Figure 7.2. Subject nogo error rates were treated by a 
mixed Groups X Congruency ANOVA. Errors increased as the proportion of go trials 
increased, F(3,407) = 156.0, p < .001, ηp
2 = .535. Only the linear trend component was 
significant (p < .001). Responses to nogo displays were also more common on incongruent 
(M = .368) than congruent trials (M = .270), F(1,407) = 165.5, p < .001, ηp
2 = .283. The 
prevalence group x congruency interaction did not approach significance, F(3, 407) = 0.8, p = 
.505, ηp
2 = .006. Notably even when go prevalence was 90% nogo errors were more common 




Figure 7.2. Probability of nogo and omission errors for congruent and incongruent displays. 
Error bars are 95% Confidence Intervals. 
Omission Errors. Omissions (failure to make any response to a go display) are also 
presented in Figure 7.2. A mixed Prevalence group X Congruency ANOVA was performed 
on subject congruent and incongruent probability of omission. The probability of omission 
did not differ significantly between prevalence groups, F(3, 407) = 2.0, p = .215, ηp
2= .011 
and the interaction of prevalence X congruency did not approach significance, F(1, 407) = 
.811, p = 488, ηp
2= .006. However omissions were more common on incongruent trials, 
F(1,407) = 12.30, p < .001, ηp
2= .0.029, MDifference = .009, 95%CI [.004,.013]. In summary 
omissions overall were rare, they did not increase with proportion of go trials, but they were 
slightly more common on incongruent go trials when flanking digits indicate a response 
should be withheld.  
 
Has changing the stimulus set affected performance? The SART typically involves 
































go digits (1-2 and 4-9). In the current experiment the go vs nogo classification was 
determined by digit magnitude (less than or greater than 5) and flanking digits were 
introduced. In attempt to assess any effects of stimulus set and the introduction of flankers on 
overall task performance, the following groups were compared: the single digit 90% 
prevalence group, 90% prevalence flanker group and the 90% group from Experiment 4 
which had single nogo digit set and single digit displays. Group error rates (pooled over 
congruency for the flanker group) and go and nogo RTS are presented in Figure 7.3. An 
independent samples Kruskal Wallis test found no difference in omissions between the 
groups, H(2) = .378, p = 828. Similarly an ANOVA performed on subject’s nogo errors found 
no difference in error rates between groups, F(2, 244) = 1.5, p = .215, ηp
2= . .013. Finally a 
mixed group X go vs. nogo ANOVA was performed on subject mean RTs (pooled over 
congruency for the flanker group). RTs were longer than nogo RTs, F(1, 244) = 195.4, p < 
.001, ηp
2= .445 but the groups go vs. nogo interaction effect was not significant, F(2, 244) = 
2.2, p = .117, ηp
2= .017. However groups did differ in their overall speed of response, F(2, 
244) = 3.3, p = .038, ηp
2= .026. This analysis was followed by a set of simple contrasts 
comparing no flanker multiple nogo digit set from the current experiment in turn with the 
flanker group from the current experiment (to isolate the effect of flankers) and the single 
digit display single digit nogo set from Experiment 4 (to isolate the effects of nogo digit set). 
The contrast between the two multiple digit set groups was not significant, p = .900 
suggesting that RTs were not changed by the introduction of flankers. The contrast between 
the two single digit display groups revealed that RTs were faster in the single digit nogo set 




Figure 7.3. Mean RTs and error rates for flanker and single display groups having 90% go 
trials. Error bars are 95% Confidence Intervals.  
 
7.4 Discussion 
The experiment used a modified version of the SART that utilized flankers to test if 
RTs on go trials would be longer to incongruent than congruent displays when go prevalence 
is low (50%) and if so to test if this FCE diminishes to zero or near zero when go prevalence 
is high (90%). Additionally, the expectation is that congruency will not affect the nogo error 
rate or speed of response to nogo digits regardless of go prevalence. A finding of a RT 
congruency effect with nogo digits is inconsistent with the view that commission errors occur 
because of impaired perception or impoverished extraction of digit numerical value from the 















































nogo digits would decrease with increasing prevalence of go trials and that error responses to 
nogo digits would be faster than responses to go digits. All of these predictions were fulfilled 
with the exception that nogo errors were more common to incongruent than congruent 
displays.  
Not only did congruency affect the probability of nogo error but also the magnitude of 
this error congruency effect was found to be independent of the proportion of go trials, 
although the effect of proportion of go trials on error rate was strong. This suggests that the 
response action indicated by flanker digits is just as likely to be extracted when response and 
withhold actions are equally likely as when a response is required for 90% of trials. It seems 
likely that flanker information and its associated response action is extracted automatically 
without involvement of attention. However, a difference in probability of error due to 
congruency of just .10 is not large. This difference is independent of the proportion of go 
trials implying that the extraction of flanker information occurred to a similar extent 
regardless of the proportion of go trials. If information is extracted to the same degree 
regardless of the proportion of go trials, why are commission errors more common the greater 
the proportion of go trials? Perhaps the displays are processed equivalently regardless of the 
proportion of go trials, but the incidence of errors is greater when go trials are more common 
because of inability to control the production of a particular action (press a mouse button) not 
because of poverty of perception. The ability to control the action depends on its level of 
preparedness (previous chapter) or its utility (Peebles and Bothell, 2004) both of which 
increase with the proportion of go trials.  
 
Congruency affects the rate of nogo errors and go RTs, but it has no effect on nogo 
RTs. How is this to be explained? One possibility is that abrupt visual change initiates a 
button press response process or motor program and this continues until production of an 
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overt button press response unless a stop signal occurs in time to halt it before the button is 
physically pressed. The fact that commission errors are more common to incongruent nogo 
displays than congruent displays suggests that the response classification (respond vs. 
withhold) of flanking and target digits is extracted from nogo displays. However, because the 
conflicting information in incongruent displays delays resolution of the appropriate respond 
or withhold action the stop instruction is not delivered in time to halt the fast response 
process. The consequence of conflicting information is delay in establishing stimulus 
classification and hence error responses occur more often to incongruent than congruent nogo 
displays. But RT to a nogo digit will not be affected by congruency because all commission 
errors are the result of an unstopped fast processes; congruent and incongruent displays will 
have equally fast responses.  
  
According to Peebles and Bothell (2004) subjects choose between competing encode 
and click and encode and check strategies on each trial on the SART. Under encode and click 
a fast response is made as soon as a stimulus is detected. This may be elaborated to mean that 
upon detection of a stimulus the mouse button click response motor program is initiated. 
Many studies that show a strategic influence on the FCE (Corballis & Gratton, 2003; Wendt 
et al., 2008) suggest that subjects apply selection strategies using the utility principle; 
processing is optimized by allocating a specific amount of attention to the flankers depending 
on their utility). Attending to the flankers is useful for performance if they are activating the 
same response, but detrimental otherwise (Lehle & Hübner, 2008). With flanked displays the 
onset of a stimulus is heralded by a change of display from a small central “+” to a string of 
five digits whereas with single digit displays the onset of a stimulus is indicated by a change 
of the “+” (or commonly with the SART from an encircled “X”) to a single digit. With the 
encode and check strategy subjects delay initiating a response for the duration they estimate 
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is needed to support accurate responding. The likelihood of a strategy being applied changes 
dynamically from trial to trial depending on the prior history of success of the strategy. 
Following incorrect application of encode and click, subjects may make an explicit choice to 
adopt encode and check, or they may simply wait for the next trial effectively ignoring the 
most recent failure.  
Many of the results from this experiment can be accommodated by this model. The 
long run success of the fast encode and click will be greater the higher the proportion of go 
trials because there will be fewer occasions when it produces an incorrect outcome (response 
to a nogo digit). Consequently, RTs to go stimuli will decrease and the nogo error rate will 
increase with increasing go probability, as was found.  
Subjects have no ability in advance of a trial to predict whether the upcoming trial 
will be a go or a nogo trial because the trial sequence was random. Therefore, the nogo error 
rate provides an estimate of the proportion responses on go trials that result from application 
of the fast encode and click strategy. Some proportion of responses to go stimuli will be fast 
and not involve extraction of information about flanker and target identity. responses 
generated by encode and click should be incapable of producing any flanker congruency 
effect. The upshot of this is that as the proportion of go stimuli increases go responses 
generated by encode and click increasingly displace responses generated by encode and 
check so that the proportion of trials capable of producing flanker congruency declines with 
increasing go probability. Consequently, the RT congruency effect on go trials will reduce 
with increasing go probability. In theory a RT FCE should be detectable even when go 
probability is high because nogo errors typically fall well short of 100% leaving sufficient 
encode and check trials to produce a congruency effect. This is consistent with the results 
from the current experiment where the go RT congruency effect reduced with increasing go 
probability but remained above zero even when 9 out of 10 trials were go trials.  
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Thus far falling go RTs, diminished incongruent-congruent RT differences and 
increased rates of nogo errors with increasing proportion of go stimuli can be accommodated 
by the Peebles and Bothell model. However other results appear to challenge it. 
A major problem for the Peebles and Bothell account is the existence of flanker 
congruency effects in responses to nogo stimuli. If nogo errors occur because a button press 
response has been initiated upon detection of stimulus onset, as opposed to digit response 
class (press a button or withhold response), then there should be no evidence of flanker 
congruency effects on trials when a nogo error has occurred. To the contrary, nogo errors 
were more likely to incongruent than congruent displays at all levels of go prevalence. These 
results suggest that when nogo errors occur flanker response classification is extracted before 
the inappropriate button press response to a no go display is initiated and that this occurs less 
often the higher the go probability. 
Further if nogo errors occur when detection of stimulus onset results in the 
inappropriate initiation of a response it is difficult to understand why nogo RTs decrease with 
increasing go probability because the information signalling response onset is the same 
(change from “+” to five digits) across all levels of go probability. While congruency had no 
effect on nogo RTs, as noted, nogo RTs did fall with increasing go probability in a manner 
very similar to RTs to go stimuli.  
The foregoing suggests that rather than being determined by stimulus detection 
information alone, response initiation on nogo trials is influenced by conflict between target 
and flanker but the contribution of this conflict to the incidence of nogo errors falls with 
increasing go probability. These challenges to the Peebles and Bothell model may be 
accommodated if modifications are made to it. The simplest is to suppose that the mean 
duration allowed from the detection of stimulus onset to the initiation of a button press 
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response itself reduces with increasing go probability, while varying within some limits from 
trial to trial. To this is added the supposition that stimulus onset is detected at shorter 
durations than flanker digit classification and that flanker classification is extracted faster 
than target digit classification (due to the fact that flanker processing was encouraged by the 
high proportion of congruent trials and that displays contained one target and four flankers). 
It follows that if the mean duration available for stimulus extraction falls with increasing go 
probability then progressively the duration available will become insufficient for target and 
flanker digit identification resulting in faster RTs to nogo stimuli with increasing go 
probability and diminishing flanker effect with increasing go probability because at shortest 
delays even flanker information is not extracted. This explanation is also able to 
accommodate findings from the experiment reported in the previous chapter, where go 





Chapter – 8 
The effects of spatial separation of go and nogo stimuli 
Experiment -6 
8.1 Introduction 
To account for the findings reported in the previous experiments it has been proposed 
that nogo errors occur when a highly prepared motor program is triggered upon, or soon after, 
detection of abrupt change in the field of view and that this program runs to completion 
unless concurrently occurring stimulus processes classify the stimulus as nogo early enough 
to stop the motor program before overt an response is produced. By this view commission 
errors should decrease when extraction of stimulus information is fast relative to the response 
execution processes – stimulus identity will occur before the motor program stop expiry time 
is reached (Aron, 2011). In chapters 2-5 delaying response production relative to stimulus 
processing led to a reduction in commission errors. In the current experiments speed of 
stimulus classification is enhanced and is expected also to reduce commission errors. In the 
original SART the division of digits into go and nogo categories was arbitrary, with many 
assigned to the go category. Under these circumstances full identification and classification 
of stimuli is likely to be relatively slow compared to obvious dichotomies based on difference 
in location, colour, or shape. For example, if green and red are quickly identified as go and 
nogo (capitalizing on previously established associations) then commission errors should be 
few relative to traditional SART as Smallwood (2013) found. Similarly, if shapes such as 
circle and triangle, or any forms that capitalize on the contrasts that are thought integral to 
object recognition (Biederman, 1987), are used to designate go and nogo, commission errors 
should be fewer than in the traditional SART.  
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In the current experiment go and nogo stimuli occurred in different locations. When 
all go digits occur in one location and all nogo digits occur elsewhere subjects can use 
location rather than digit magnitude to determine whether to respond or make no response. In 
this situation, although instructed to respond to all digits except the digit 3, subjects could 
completely ignore digit value and still achieve fast RTs with perfect accuracy. The 
experiment involved three conditions. A traditional SART in which both go and nogo digits 
appeared in the screen centre (Central go, Central nogo or CC condition) was compared with 
conditions where go and nogo stimuli were spatially separated. In a CP condition all go 
stimuli appeared in the centre of the screen and nogo stimuli appeared equally often to the left 
and to the right of centre (Central go, Peripheral nogo, hence CP). Finally, the spatial 
arrangements were reversed in a PC condition: go stimuli were presented equally often in the 
two peripheral locations and all no go stimuli appeared in the centre of the screen. In all three 
conditions the proportion of go trials was .89. The response requirements are identical in all 
three conditions so that manipulation of the relative speed of response and stimulus 
identification processes was achieved by reducing stimulus categorization time alone.  
If information regarding location is extracted faster in the CP and PC conditions than 
digit category in the CC condition nogo errors should be fewer in the CP and PC conditions 
than CC condition. Furthermore, if stimulus identity is extracted faster when go and nogo 
digits are spatially separated it is likely that responses to go stimuli will also be faster in the 
CP and PC conditions. The combination of faster responding with fewer errors is counter to 
claims that commission errors in the SART are manifestations of speed-accuracy trade-off 
(Head & Helton, 2014b, 2014a; Helton, Head, & Russell, 2011; Wilson, Russell, & Helton, 
2015). An appealing feature of the proposal of a race between response production and 
stimulus classification is that it can also account for situations where go responses are fast 
and nogo errors relatively uncommon. The critical factor determining the frequency of nogo 
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errors is not held to be speed of response per se but speed of response relative to speed of 
classification of a stimulus as nogo. When response processes are fast relative to processes 
that classify the stimulus as nogo commission errors will be more common. 
Subjects also have the ability to prioritize the extent and locus of their field of visual 
attention (Posner, 1978: Cave & Chen, 2016). In the CC condition all stimuli occur in the one 
central location so that the field of visual attention is likely to be small and centrally focused 
at the time stimuli are presented. Similarly, in the CP condition the field of visual attention is 
likely, at the time of stimulus presentation, to have been confined to a relatively small central 
region because nearly 90% of stimuli and all stimuli requiring overt response occur centrally. 
An important difference between the CC and CP conditions is that in the CC condition all go 
and all nogo stimuli occur within the field of attention whereas in the CP condition, it is 
expected that all nogo stimuli will occur outside of the attended region. This difference is 
important because if subjects in high go situations initiate a highly prepared response only to 
stimuli appearing at an attended location when abrupt visual change occurs inappropriate 
responding to nogo stimuli should be virtually non-existent in the CP condition.  
Defining the extent of the field of visual attention and its locus is more difficult in the 
PC condition. Here close to 45% of stimuli and 50% of all go stimuli occur randomly in each 
the two peripheral locations while a little over 10% of stimuli occur centrally. Consequently, 
the focus of attention may not be confined to a single or small region on most trials. If nogo 
error rates are similar between the nogo central (PC) and nogo peripheral conditions (CP), 
then it is likely that subjects are responding to sudden stimulus onset regardless of where the 




Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, (2004, p.850) argue that visual attention is drawn to salient 
stimuli that ‘pop out’ from their surroundings and that attention can be voluntarily directed to 
“objects of current importance to the observer”. Connor et al., (2004) also suggest that when 
a cue appears at an identical location to an upcoming target, attention will be focused to the 
target location in advance causing quicker responses. Because of the possibility that the mask 
in the SART might act as like a pre-cue and direct attention to its location no mask followed 




Sixty undergraduate students (31 female) from an introductory psychology class at the 
University of Canterbury participated in exchange for course credit. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants ranged in age between 17 and 49 years (M 
= 21.2 years, SD = 5.4 years). The research was approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee and students were asked if they wished not to have their data 
included anonymously in any published study. None elected to withdraw their data. 
Apparatus  
Participants were tested in groups of 10 seated at individual cubicles in a larger 35-
cubicle psychology laboratory at the university. They were seated approximately 50cm in 
front of an LCD computer screen (377 mm x 303 mm, 1680 x 1050 pixels, 60 Hz refresh 
rate) that was mounted at eye level. Their head movements were not restrained. Stimuli 
presentation and response accuracy and timing were achieved using E- prime 2.0 software 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). All responses occurring in the 1150 ms interval 
between stimulus onsets were recorded but on trials where more than one response was 
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detected, response time for only the last response was recorded. Response times were 
recorded with millisecond precision using the left mouse button of a mouse connected to a 
serial port of an i7 PC computer running Windows 7. Mobile phones were deactivated for the 
duration of the experiment. 
Stimuli and procedure 
Stimuli were the numerals 1–9 displayed in black Symbol 94 pt font on a white 
background for 250ms. Stimuli were replaced by a blank white screen for 900 ms until 
followed by display of the digit for the next trial. The digits were presented equally often but 
randomized over the entire set of 225 trials. The digit 3 was the designated nogo and the 
remaining digits were go digits. Responses made within 1150 ms of a digit onset were 
accepted and participants were asked to press the left mouse button as quickly as possible to 
digits while avoiding making any overt response to the nogo digit. As is standard with the 
SART subjects completed 18 practice trials, which gave accuracy feedback, before 
commencing the main experimental trials. The entire experiment took about 10 minutes to 
complete. Participants were randomly assigned on arrival for testing in a between groups 
design to either the CC, CP or PC condition. 
 
8.3 Results 
A total of 21 subjects (between 6 and 8 per group) registered more than a single 
mouse button press response on at least one trial. The number of multiple responses per 
subject ranged from 1 to 5. Where these occurred on nogo trials they were counted as 
commission errors. Trials involving multiple responses were excluded from the analysis of 
RTs because on these trials the time for the last response alone was recorded.  
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Omission Errors: Omissions were rare. Median omission errors rates were 0.000 for 
the CC group, and .005 for both the CP and PC groups. No significant difference between 
groups in omissions was detected; Kruskal-Wallis independent samples test H(2) = 2.30, p 
=.36. 
Commission Errors: Group mean commission errors are displayed in Figure 8.1. 
Subject probability of commission errors were treated by a between groups ANOVA. Group 
means differed, F(2,57) = 27.71, p < .001 ηp
2 = .493. Follow up Bonferroni tests revealed that 
commission errors were more common in the CC (M = .470) than CP (M = .138) condition, p 
< .001, MDifference = .332, 95%CI [.22, .44] and marginally more common than in the PC (M = 
.358) than CC condition, p = .050, MDifference = .112, 95%CI [.000, .224]. Commission errors 
were also more frequent in the PC than CP condition, p < .001, MDifference  = .220, 95%CI 
[.108, .332]. Further, one sample t-tests performed separately for the CP and PC data revealed 
that commission errors were not eliminated when go and no go stimuli were spatially 
separated: for the CP condition t(19) = 6.02, p < .001, M = .138, 95%CI [.09, .19]; PC 
condition t(19) = 8.89, p < .001, M = .358, 95%CI [.274, .442]. 
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Figure 8.1. Group mean RTs and mean probability of commission error. Error bars are 
standard error of the mean. 
Response Times: Group mean go and nogo RTs are displayed in Figure 8.1. Subject 
mean go and nogo RTs were treated by a separate between groups ANOVAs because group 
go and nogo SDs were quite different, especially for the CP group. Mean go RTs differed, 
F(2,57) = 6.44, p = .003, ηp
2 = .184. Bonferroni tests revealed that compared to the CC 
condition separating the locations of go and nogo RTs speeded go responses in the CP 
condition, p = .010, MDifference = 35.9 ms, 95%CI [7.0, 64.7] but not in the PC condition when 
go stimuli appeared in different off-centre positions, p = 1.000, MDifference = - 1.0 ms, 95%CI 
[-29.8, 27.9]. Responses were faster in the CP than PC condition, p = .008, MDifference = -36.8 
ms, 95%CI [-65.7, -8.0]. Turning to responses made in error to nogo stimuli a between 
groups ANOVA revealed there was no detectable difference between groups in their mean 
nogo RTs, F(2, 55) = .08, p = .919, ηp
2 = .003. Finally the difference between go and nogo 
RTs was explored for each group using related measures t-tests. For the CC and PC groups 
responses to nogo digits were faster:,CC. group t(19) = 8.18, p < .001, MDifference = 44.6 ms, 















































48.0]. There was no detectable difference between go and nogo RTs for the CP group, t(17) = 
.08, p = .938, MDifference = 2.1 ms, 95%CI [-54.1, 58.4]. Two subjects in the CP group made no 
commission errors and hence no RTs.  
 
8.4 Discussion 
This experiment attempted to test three primary hypotheses: 1) If stimulus 
classification is faster in the CP and PC conditions than CC (due to spatial separation) then 
fewer commission errors should occur in these conditions along with faster go RTs. 2) If 
responses are initiated only to attended locations we should theoretically expect no 
commission errors in the CP condition. 3) If commissions in CP and PC conditions are the 
same then subjects may not be responding to sudden onset.  
In go/nogo tasks such as the SART go and nogo stimuli are typically presented in a 
single central location so that perfect classification of stimuli as go vs. nogo necessarily 
involves identification the digits. However, when go and nogo stimuli always appear in 
different locations digit value becomes irrelevant and perfect classification of stimuli as go 
vs. nogo can be made on the basis of location alone. If nogo errors occur in high go tasks 
because response production processes outrun concurrent stimulus identification processes, 
then the rate of nogo errors should be reduced by any manipulation that speeds stimulus 
classification relative to response production. In experiments 1 to 3 (chapters 2 to 5) stimulus 
categorization was speeded relative to response production by delaying response production. 
In the current experiment it was hoped that spatial separation of go from nogo digits would 
again advantage stimulus categorization relative to response production, this time because 
determination of location should take less time than categorization of digits. Consistent with 
this expectation the probability of nogo error fell from nearly .50 to near .15 when all go 
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stimuli were centrally located and nogo stimuli occurred in two off-centre positions At the 
same time, speed of response to go stimuli fell by around 36 ms to be equal to the normally 
faster error responses. Notably this result is not an example of speed-accuracy trade-off 
which has previously been put forward as an explanation for nogo errors (Head & Helton, 
2014b, 2014a; Helton, Head, & Russell, 2011; Wilson et al., 2015). 
However, when locations were reversed so that all nogo digits appeared centrally 
while go digits were randomly dispersed between two off-centre locations the drop in error 
was much less, close to .35 although go RTs were almost identical to those in the traditional 
situation where all stimuli appear centrally. The fact that the different spatial arrangements 
result in different rates of commission error and differing response speeds might be taken to 
suggest that when go and nogo digits appear in different locations subjects do not initiate 
their response immediately upon detection of abrupt change in their field of view.  
When all go stimuli and only go stimuli occur in the centre in a high go task the area 
encompassed by the field of attention is likely to be small and have its locus precisely where 
the digits occur, and importantly, be focussed at the location prior to stimulus presentation. 
By contrast when go stimuli are dispersed between two peripheral locations and much rarer 
nogo stimuli occur in the centre, more options are possible. The field of attention may 
comprise a single continuous area incorporating both off-centre locations and the centre. This 
situation is similar to the traditional SART in that both go and nogo stimuli occur within the 
focus of attention but now within a much larger field. Alternatively, subjects may confine 
their field of attention to one or other of the off-centre locations on each trial depending upon 
their expectations regarding the location of the next go trial and they may even focus 
attention in the centre if they believe a nogo trial to be imminent. Regardless subjects are 
often likely to locate attention in the wrong place on around half of all trials. If the locus of 
attention is in the wrong place sudden onset of the stimulus in a non-attended and empty 
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location will bring about a shift of attention to the location of the stimulus (Posner, 1978: 
Cave & Chen, 2016). In both of these scenarios stimulus classification is likely to be retarded 
relative to the situation where all go stimuli appear centrally. As a result, commission errors 
are expected to be greater and RTs longer when go stimuli appear in two rather than a single 
location. However, when stimuli are not central, but the positions are readily discriminable, 
there is no link between peripheral locations and response, so generally they don’t respond to 
peripheral events, unless occasionally sudden onset over-rides everything. 
Spatial separation alone does not appear to be the sole driver of differences in RT and 
Commission errors. Turatto & Galfano, (2000) have shown that attentional capture can be 
triggered by manipulations of colour, form, and luminance suggesting that these physical 
properties can capture attention automatically. Relative to the traditional situation where go 
and nogo stimuli are both centrally located the combination of shorter RTs and fewer 
commission errors occurred only in the CP condition. What difference between the CP and 
PC conditions could account for the combination of greater speed with fewer errors in the CP 
condition? In the CP condition stimuli always occur in one location (centre), whereas in the 
PC condition stimuli occur equally often on the left and the right. In the CP condition 
subjects can be certain about the location of a go stimulus and direct the focus of attention 
accordingly. However, it is not possible to similarly determine a suitable locus for attention 
on every trial in the PC condition. A possibility is that participants adopt a narrow attentional 
zoom to exclude the peripheral distractors making it easier to ignore the nogo stimuli. It could 
be that the inferior performance in the PC condition relative to the CP occurs because the 
“beam” is cast too wide and the central stimuli cannot be ignored if they are monitoring both 
peripheral positions. If there is a quick and early process that reliably distinguishes go from 
nogo digits subjects will adopt it after a few initial trials as may have happened in Smallwood 
(2013) when all nogo stimuli were red and all go black. The inclusion of black nogo and red 
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go requires a more detailed analysis of digit identity, and the more lengthy discrimination 
process prevents responses initiated by sudden onset to be halted before a response is 
produced, leading to a higher incidence of commission errors. 
Both the CP and PC conditions involve the addition of peripheral locations and it 
could be argued they should result in similar reductions in nogo errors. However, on closer 
inspection it may not be correct to assume that the CP and PC conditions involve equal 
variety simply because they both involve three locations. Variety or uncertainty is 
quantifiable by using a measure derived from information theory (Fitts and Posner, 1967 pp. 
85-87). Uncertainty or variety is quantified in terms of the H, in which a situation involving 
two equally likely but unpredictable alternatives has H = 1 bit of uncertainty. For the CP 
condition H = .55 and for the PC condition H = 1.39. This is because in the PC condition the 
variation in location involves the more frequent category (go) whereas in the CP condition 
variation in location involves the rarer nogo category. By the uncertainty metric, the PC 
condition is more varied and therefore should provide more exogenous support for attention 
and in turn lead to fewer commission errors than are expected in the CP condition. 
Response requirements are the same in all three conditions. If it is repetitive 
responding alone that results in impoverished support for the maintenance of attention to the 
task (Robertson et al., 1997 etc.), then there should be no difference in commission errors 
between the three conditions in this experiment (which was not the case). Helton and 
colleagues take a different view (Helton et al., 2005, 2009). They argue that the additional 
task-induced cognitive load introduced by spatial uncertainty interferes with performance 
(Fitts & Posner,1967) and therefore should increase nogo errors. Based on these arguments 
our results would bode poorly for the perceptual decoupling argument as its appears that 
spatial uncertainty has not enhanced performance on the task in the PC condition when 
compared to the CP condition, in fact the result is the reverse of prediction. Perhaps future 
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experiments could involve placing the centre and off-centre locations on the surface of a 
single object and comparing it with locations on the surfaces of two distinct objects. The 
expectation would be that commission errors will be far fewer when the locations of go and 











Go/nogo tasks are currently used for at least two major purposes: to measure 
sustained attention among a wide variety of clinical populations (see Seli 2016 and Chapter 1 
for reviews), and, especially in neuroscience, as a measure of response inhibition (for reviews 
see Aharoni et al., (2013); Criaud & Boulinguez, 2013). That similar go/nogo tasks are used 
to measure apparently different constructs suggests some general lack of understanding at a 
theoretical level of the cognitive processes and mechanisms underlying performance on 
go/nogo tasks. The experiments reported in this thesis were motivated by disagreement 
among explanations of performance on the Sustained Attention to Response task (SART) 
(Robertson et al., 1997), but can be considered in a broader context.  
In the SART subjects are instructed to respond by pressing a button or key as quickly 
as possible to the digits 1-9 but to make no response to a designated nogo digit (typically 3). 
Robertson et al. (1997), who developed the task, proposed that inappropriate response to the 
nogo digit (nogo error or commission error) occurred during moments when attention to 
responses had lapsed allowing the triggering of an automatized button or key press response, 
which was appropriate on 89% of trials. Helton and colleagues (Finkbeiner et al., 2015; Head 
& Helton, 2013, 2014b; Helton, Head, & Russell, 2011; Helton et al., 2009) provide data and 
argument which can be interpreted as broadly in agreement with the proposal that errors 
result from problems controlling or inhibiting a pre-potent motor response, a view that has 
similarities to the notion of inhibitory control, which is assumed in many neuro-imaging 
studies. 
More recently attention lapse has been conceived as a product of mind-wandering, 
which in turn leads to a state where attention is said to be decoupled or disconnected from 
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perception (Schooler et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) An important difference 
between this explanation of nogo errors and Robertson et al. (1997) is that Robertson et al. 
consider the lapse in attention to affect response control, while the term “perceptual 
decoupling” implies that errors occur because of failure on the part of perceptual processes to 
correctly classify stimuli as go vs. nogo, or perhaps because of failure to select the go vs. 
nogo classification of the digit as the determinant of whether a response should be made or 
withheld. 
Agreement that attention has a role to play in the genesis of nogo errors in the SART 
is not universal. Peebles and Bothell (2004) explicitly deny any role for attention. Instead 
they propose that errors occur when people choose to act speedily without consideration of 
results of analysis of sensory information (their encode and click strategy) rather than elect to 
respond only after information extraction has led to classification of the current digit as go, or 
not nogo (encode and check strategy). The two strategies are in competition on each trial. 
Which process wins is determined by the relative benefits of speed against cost of error, 
which is determined historically from previous success (of correct response and correct 
withhold) and error (respond to a nogo digit, and more rarely omission). The big contribution 
of the Peebles and Bothell model is the introduction of the idea that the probability of 
committing nogo errors can be conceived in terms of costs and benefits of respond and 
withhold actions. The experiments reported in this thesis were conceived against this 
background. An initial aim was to establish the relative roles of perceptual analysis, motor 
control, and the selective processes of attention on SART performance.  
Typically, SART stimuli are displayed for 250 ms. As shown in chapters 2 to 5 digits 
can be reliably identified when displayed for just 50 ms. This leaves opportunity for re-
engagement of attention should a subject have been perceptually decoupled when the digit 
first appeared. The opportunity for re-engagement of attention with perception should be 
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severely reduced when display duration is a mere 50 ms, provided it is followed by a mask 
that effectively terminates the display (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007). Consequently, if nogo 
errors occur when attention is decoupled from perception it is expected that the errors will be 
more prevalent with briefer than longer displays. To the contrary, it was found in each of the 
experiments in chapters 2, 3 and 4 that reducing the duration of stimuli to 70 ms and then 50 
ms had no detectable effect on nogo errors or go and nogo RTs. The conclusion drawn from 
the results of these close replications of SART procedures was that either re-coupling of 
attention with perception did not occur during the lifetime of a 250 ms display or perceptual 
decoupling did not occur at all in these experiments.  
Another way to assess the role of perceptual decoupling is to have subjects delay the 
production of their responses to briefly presented stimuli. When stimuli are presented briefly 
and followed immediately by a mask that effectively terminates the display, requiring 
subjects to delay production of their responses should provide no additional opportunity to 
benefit from perceptual processing of stimuli and therefore introducing delay should have no 
effect on the probability of nogo error. To the contrary nogo errors fell in all three 
experiments where subjects were instructed to delay responses for 250 ms or more. These 
results concur with others who delayed response production by extending the motor 
requirements of responding (Head et al., 2017; Wilson et al., 2018) or by requiring subjects to 
synchronize their response production to a regular tone (Seli, Cheyne, Barton, & Smilek, 
2012). In some conditions in these studies nogo errors were reduced to as low as 2% and 5%. 
If it is accepted that recovery from perceptual decoupling is unlikely with the longer displays 
used in these studies (based on the finding that reducing stimulus variation had no detectable 
effects nogo errors in experiments 1,3 and 3), then delaying responses may reduce nogo 
errors in SART-like tasks to near zero levels and leave little or no room for perceptual 
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decoupling or any explanation of nogo errors that has stimulus processing or lack of correct 
classification of stimuli as the cause of error.  
Nevertheless, response delay had a less dramatic effect in the present experiments; 
nogo errors exceeded 20%. One reason for the lesser effect of delay interval in the current 
experiments may be the nature of the delay task itself. While Seli et al (2012) report greater 
reduction in nogo error with increasing delay interval using a metronome synchronization 
task, no difference in nogo errors occurred in Experiment 2 across delay intervals from 250 to 
650 ms. The lack of additional reduction in nogo errors at longer delay intervals may reflect 
the fact that on occasions subjects in Experiment 2 went on to respond when the mask 
changed although they had successfully resisted responding to the nogo digit on the same 
trial.  
One question that has been overlooked so far is what actually triggers a response to a 
nogo stimulus in the SART and similar tasks. Robertson et al. (1997) ascribe response 
production on nogo trials to execution of an automatized button press response. But what 
triggers the automatized action? Peebles and Bothell (2004) propose that high benefit of 
speed and rare cost from error causes adoption of a fast strategy in which response production 
is initiated before the stimulus has been classified. Again, if the response is not triggered by 
stimulus classification what triggers the fast response? The finding in Experiment 2 that 
subjects who had made no response to a digit but later in the trial responded quickly 
following the mask change suggests that abrupt visual change may be the trigger that initiates 
rapid response to nogo stimuli in high-go tasks like the SART. This is consistent with the 
finding that responses to nogo stimuli were 50 ms to 70 ms faster than responses to go stimuli 
in all no-delay conditions in the experiments reported in this thesis except in Experiment 6 
(chapter 8) when go and nogo stimuli appeared in different locations.  
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One factor likely to increase the propensity to respond to nogo digits is level of 
preparedness (Miller 1998) of the button or key press response. Probably the strongest 
influence on preparedness or expectation that a response is required on a particular trial is the 
proportion or prevalence of go trials experienced. The idea that response preparedness and 
expectation increases propensity for nogo error is built into the original explanation of nogo 
errors proposed by Robertson et al. (1997) According to Robertson et al. more frequent 
repetitive responding to go stimuli leads to increased automatization of the response and also 
increases the likelihood of attention lapse. The same prediction can be derived from mind-
wandering perspectives if it is assumed that mind-wandering, and hence the decoupling of 
perception from perception, is more likely the more repetitive and less intrinsically variable 
the task environment. Peebles and Bothell (2004) suppose that adoption of the fast encode 
and click strategy depends on the extent to which the benefits of speed outweigh the cost of 
error. The higher the prevalence of go trials the more likely a fast encode and click response 
will incur nogo errors. All theories predict increasing probability of nogo error with 
increasing proportion of go trials. While others have explored the effects of go prevalence 
across a narrow range of go prevalence using the SART (Manly et al., 2000) or across a 
wider range of go proportions in a SART-like task (Wilson et al., 2018) there appears to be 
no published study exploring the effects of go prevalence on SART performance at several 
levels from low (50%) to high (98%) prevalence. Experiment 4 was designed to fill that gap.  
Preparedness of a response may also affect its latency and/or speed of execution. 
Robertson et al. proposed that speed of response would increase the longer the uninterrupted 
run of go trials. Because average run length increases with increasing proportion of go trials 
RTs to both go and nogo stimuli should decrease with increasing go prevalence. More precise 
predictions can be derived from Peebles and Bothell (2004). Because their model predicts 
that fast encode and click responses become more frequent with increasing go prevalence it 
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follows that the mix of fast click and slower encode and check strategies will shift in favour 
of fast click as go prevalence rises, and hence go RTs are predicted to decrease with 
increasing go prevalence. However, since nogo errors result from application of the same fast 
click strategy error responses to nogo stimuli should remain constant across all levels of go 
prevalence. Similarly, if response production on nogo trials is triggered by detection of abrupt 
visual change that occurs with stimulus onset then speed of response to nogo stimuli should 
remain much the same regardless proportion of go trials. Importantly the differing predictions 
for the effects of go prevalence on speed of response to nogo stimuli provides a test which 
seems capable of discriminating the attention based theory of Robertson et al from the 
Peebles and Bothell model that includes no role for attention and the proposal that nogo 
errors arise when subjects respond to abrupt visual change, regardless of its source.  
Experiment 4 (chapter 6) was a very close replication of SART procedures, the only 
change being the proportion of go trials. prevalence was also varied in Experiment 5, this 
time in fewer and larger increments from 50% go to 90% go and where go and nogo digits 
were flanked on either side by congruent or incongruent distractor digits. Despite these and 
other differences the probability of nogo error increased with go prevalence and at similar 
rates between the two experiments. At the same time RTs to go stimuli decreased in both 
experiments and more steeply when go prevalence exceeded about 76%. Of particular interest 
is the relationship between go prevalence and RTs to nogo stimuli. In both experiments speed 
of response to nogo digits also decreased with the prevalence of go trials and at a similar rate 
to go stimuli. Also RTs to nogo stimuli were about 50 ms to 60 ms faster than responses to go 
stimuli.  
The finding that responses to nogo digits became faster the greater the proportion of 
go trials poses difficulties for any theory which assumes nogo errors are generated by a single 
process that has a constant completion time regardless of proportion of go trials. These results 
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suggest that the fast click strategy of Peebles and Bothell (2004) and the proposal put forward 
above that nogo errors occur when response is triggered by detection of abrupt change in the 
visual field are not viable in their present forms. They could remain viable if it were supposed 
that speed of execution of the encode and click process and detection of abrupt change 
themselves increased with go prevalence. When go prevalence is high preparedness and 
expectation of response is higher and it is possible that the act of responding is delivered 
more confidently with force (the key is pressed harder) and as a result more quickly or 
perhaps the response is initiated sooner due to of a lower threshold for the detection of visual 
change in high go situations. However, these alone may not be sufficient to account for the 
70-80 ms drop in nogo RTs. Another possibility stems from visual search studies. Here it has 
been found that when the proportion of target absent trials is high subjects terminate the 
search process earlier (Rich et al., 2008). The analogous situation in go/nogo is that when the 
proportion of go trials is high and making a response has low cost subjects will terminate 
stimulus information extraction processes early and not delay response production long 
enough to establish the stimulus as go or not nogo.  
The main purpose of Experiment 5, which involved congruent and incongruent 
flanking digits (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Lehle & Hübner, 2008; Sanders & Lamers, 2002), 
was not to explore the effects of go prevalence but to use go prevalence in combination with 
the congruency relation between a central target digit and so-called distractor flanking digits 
to explore the extent of information processed from displays in high go tasks. Normally the 
flanker congruency effect (FCE) is evidenced by the difference in RT between incongruent 
minus congruent displays in 2-choice tasks. In the present context a FCE for go trials is 
defined as the RT difference between incongruent minus congruent displays.  
Since both Roberston et al. (1997) and perceptual decoupling explanations (Schooler 
et al., 2011; Smallwood & Schooler, 2015) suppose that attention is engaged on a majority go 
102 
 
trials, they predict a positive FCE for go trials. Similarly, Peebles and Bothell (2004) predict 
a positive FCE for go trials because generally responses result from application of the slower 
encode and check strategy, which it is expected will lead to classification of both central and 
flanking digits. Results from Experiment 5 provide clear evidence of a FCE congruency 
effect on RTs in go trials.  
More interesting are nogo trials. A subject who is perceptually decoupled during 
presentation of a display should not have access to the results of perceptual processing of the 
display and therefore no FCE effect is expected on nogo trials. According to Peebles and 
Bothell (2004) nogo errors occur when people adopt the fast encode and click strategy 
initiating a response without regard to stimulus classification. Again no FCE is expected on 
nogo trials. Similarly, if error responses on nogo trials occur because responses are initiated 
upon detection of abrupt visual change no FCE is predicted on nogo trials. In accord with 
these predictions no FCE was observed for RTs on nogo trials.  
The effects of congruency can also be measured from examination of accuracy or 
error rates. For go trials an accuracy FCE exists if the probability of omission error is greater 
on incongruent trials where the central digit is a go digit and the flanking digits are nogo. 
Although omissions were rare, they were overall slightly more common on incongruent than 
congruent trials but not affected by the proportion of go trials.-go errors being more common 
allow greater use of accuracy. An accuracy FCE exists when the probability of response to a 
nogo display is higher for incongruent than congruent displays. The probability of nogo error 
was a little under 0.1 higher when the central digit was nogo and the flanker a go digit than 
when both central and flanking digits were go digits. The size of this difference was not 




The finding that the probability of nogo error is affected by congruency is notable. All 
theories of SART performance agree that responses to nogo stimuli occur because 
information regarding stimulus classification as go vs. nogo has not been extracted or not 
used to determine action. If that is true how is an accuracy FCE possible on nogo trials? The 
implication from a nogo accuracy FCE is that stimulus information is available, at least on 
some occasions, when a response has been made to a nogo display, although the speed of 
response was not affected by display congruency. One way to account for the effect of 
congruency on the rate of nogo errors is to suppose that stimulus information accrues over 
time automatically from the moment of abrupt change to a level where digits are classified as 
go or nogo regardless of allocation of attention (Kouider & Dehaene, 2007; Lehle & Hübner, 
2008). At the same time an extended set of motor processes that control the initiation and 
production of the go response unfolds. If stimulus extraction occurs quickly relative to 
response production then classification of the stimulus as nogo may occur soon enough to 
halt the response production processes before an overt response is produced (Aron, 2011). 
Classification will occur soon enough to prevent overt response more often for congruent 
than incongruent displays because conflicting classifications are extracted from incongruent 
displays and these take additional time to resolve (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Sanders & 
Lamers, 2002). However, RTs of responses to nogo displays will not be affected by 
congruency. When classification of the display as nogo occurs too late to prevent an overt 
response, a response is made and its latency is determined by the speed of execution of 
response processes, which presumably are similar regardless of the classification of the 
display.  
The idea that nogo errors occur when response production processes outpace 
concurrently running stimulus extraction processes suggests that manipulations which speed 
stimulus classification relative to response production should reduce the probability of nogo 
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error. This prediction was explored in Experiment 6 (chapter 8) by varying the locations of go 
and nogo stimuli in an adaption of the usual high go SART procedures. In the traditional 
SART all stimuli are presented centrally and classification of stimuli as go or nogo requires 
discrimination between Arabic numerals, or at least the distinction between “3” and the 
remaining digits. However the need to discriminate digits is by-passed when all go digits 
appear centrally and nogo digits are displaced peripherally to the left or right. The probability 
of nogo error fell from near .50 to near .15 when go vs nogo digit classification could be 
determined from location without the necessity to consider digit identity. At the same time go 
RTs fell from around 280 ms to less than 240 ms and the usual difference in RT between go 
and nogo digits disappeared.  
Typically, with the SART speedier response is associated with higher probability of 
nogo error. The finding of faster responses and reduced probability of error shows that errors 
in the SART are not inevitably a consequence of trading speed for accuracy. In this case 
classification of go stimuli was fast because go stimuli occurred at an attended location and 
nogo stimuli occurred outside of it. Errors were much less common because relative to 
response execution, stimulus classification was fast. But typically when subjects increase 
response speed stimulus extraction processes become relatively slower so that response 
processes have proceeded beyond the stage that stimulus classification can stop overt action. 
Consequently, the probability of nogo error increases with speed of response.  
Experiment 6 also included a reverse arrangement in which all nogo stimuli were 
centrally located and go digits appeared equally often to the left or right (PC condition). This 
time probability of nogo errors fell but only to about .35 while go RTs were virtually the 
same as those in the CC condition and slower than nogo responses. In some regards the CP 
and PC conditions are similar. Both appear to involve the same response requirements and go 
and nogo stimuli are discriminable by location alone in both conditions. But they differ in 
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terms of the way visual attention might be allocated across the screen. When all go stimuli 
appear in the centre of the screen and infrequent nogo stimuli occur to the left or right, 
discrimination of go from nogo is likely to be fast – if screen change occurs in the centre 
respond otherwise do not respond. But when go stimuli are displayed equally often at 
different locations on either side of the screen and rarer nogo digits appear only in the centre 
either the attentional field will encompass all areas, or attention might be focused on one 
location at the expense of others requiring redirection of attention as part of the stimulus 
classification process. In both cases classification of stimuli as go vs. nogo is likely to be 
retarded relative central go peripheral nogo arrangement. If response processes are the same, 
then the relative speed of classification is slower when go stimuli are split between two 
peripheral locations and hence go RTs will be longer and nogo errors more common when go 
stimuli are split between two locations.  
Experiment 6 has relevance for the claim that lapses in attention occur in the SART 
because its repetitive and unvarying nature provide little exogenous support for the 
maintenance of attention to the task. Robertson et al. interpreted this to mean the repetitive 
response requirements of a high go task. The term perceptual decoupling implies that it is 
lack of variation in stimulus properties which leads to the disengagement of attention from 
the task. Spatial variation in the context of identical response requirements increases stimulus 
variation, and therefore increases exogenous support for the maintenance of attention on the 
task. Stimulus variety can be quantified using information metrics of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
or variety is greater in Experiment 4 when go stimuli were split between two peripheral 
locations than when all go stimuli were centrally located. Contrary to predictions based on 
exogenous support nogo errors (instances of attention disengagement) were higher, not lower, 
when variety was greater. 
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Over all the results from the current Experiments provide little support for the idea 
that nogo errors occur because lack of task variety encourages mind-wandering and a 
disconnection between attention and perceptual processes of information extraction relating 
to stimulus classification as go vs. nogo. The factors that most strongly determine the 
probability of overt response to a nogo stimulus appear to be: the proportion of go trials and 
manipulations that affect the relative speed of information extraction and response production 
processes. Proportion of go trials affects probability of nogo error because it both alters the 
relative benefit of speed over the cost of error and determines the level of preparedness and 
anticipation that overt response is appropriate. The relative speed of stimulus classification 
involves such manipulations as delaying response production or lengthening the execution 
process and expediting stimulus classification (e.g. location, colour, and other salient 
differences between go and nogo stimuli). Future research could perhaps deal with the 
predictable occurrence of stimuli in the SART by varying the ISI or even alter the nature of 
the response by having subjects press a sequence of buttons for go stimuli. This would allow 
insight into the race for perceptual processes to catch up to motor processes. 
To conclude, we could say that in a sense perceptual decoupling may be correct in its 
explanation of nogo errors in high go situations, errors do occur when stimulus information is 
not extracted, but the reason is not disengagement of attention from perception, extraction 
processes continue without attention. The reason is the inability to control a highly prepared 
response process triggered by abrupt change which does not allow time for perception to 
proceed and allow stimulus classification to control action. Both motor and perception 
decoupling are in a sense correct, it is just that inability to control an automated motor act is 
prior, it is the reason the product of perceptual processes arrives too late to stop the 
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